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Shareholder Collaboration
Jill E. Fisch* and Simone M. Sepe**
Two models of the firm dominate corporate law. Under the managementpower model, decision-making power rests primarily with corporate insiders
(officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model defends
increased shareholder power to limit managerial authority. Both models view
insiders and shareholders as engaged in a competitive struggle for corporate
power in which corporate law functions to promote operational efficiency while
limiting managerial agency costs.
As scholars and judges continue to debate the appropriate balance of power
between shareholders and insiders, corporate practice has moved on.
Increasingly, the insider–shareholder dynamic is collaborative, not competitive.
This Article traces the development of insider–shareholder collaboration,
explaining how collaboration, which originated in the venture capital context,
has expanded into public companies. This expansion, the Article argues, is due
to the increasing importance of partial information problems that, for many
firms, have grown costlier than agency costs. Using insights from the economics
of information, the Article shows how collaboration promotes the production and
aggregation of information from insiders and shareholders, adding value that is
lost under unilateral decision-making.
Modern corporate law and corporate governance are poorly prepared to
handle insider–shareholder collaboration, however. The collaborative process
places novel demands on traditional obligations of confidentiality and fiduciary
duty as well as complicating the meaning of conflicts of interest. These concepts
must be rethought to enable productive collaboration while limiting the potential
that the collaborative process can be manipulated to permit collusive behavior
or self-dealing.

Introduction
Since the groundbreaking work of Ronald Coase in 1937,1 law and
economics scholars have debated theories of the firm and their application to

* Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
** Professor of Law and Finance, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona and
Toulouse School of Economics. We are grateful for comments received at the American Law &
Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Law & Economics Seminar at Duke Law School, the
Center for Financial Studies in the House of Finance at Goethe University, the lunchtime seminar
in law at Université du Luxembourg, the Institutional Investor Activism and Engagement
Conference at Bar Ilan and Hebrew Universities, and the SIDE––ISLE 2017––13th Annual
Conference at LUMSA University in Rome.
1. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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corporate law. Two models have come to dominate: the management-power
model and the shareholder-power model. The management-power model,
consistent with Coase’s account of the firm as a hierarchical organization,2
emphasizes the board’s decision-making authority.3 The competing
shareholder-power model deemphasizes management authority in favor of
accountability and defends greater shareholder power to ensure that corporate
insiders—both directors and managers—are held fully accountable.4
Proponents of both models agree on two things, however. First, they
regard managerial moral hazard as the central problem of corporate law.5
Second, both assume that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a
competitive struggle for corporate power.6 Under this shared assumption,
corporate law entails a narrative of recurring battles with winners and losers.
Meanwhile, the corporate world has moved on. Shareholders are no
longer dispersed and passive but empowered, yet they are using their greater
power not to wrest control but to work jointly with insiders, bringing new

2. Id. at 390–92.
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557–59 (2003) (describing exclusive board authority as
essential to overcome the collective action problem affecting corporate production); Eugene F.
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313 (1983)
(emphasizing the role of the board as a decision controller charged with monitoring and ratifying
management decisions).
4. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (arguing for giving shareholders the power to initiate changes in the
corporate charter and the state of incorporation); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 694–711 (2007) (advocating reforming corporate elections to give
more power to shareholders).
5. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (arguing that the dominant view in contemporary discussions
of corporate governance is that the “central economic problem addressed by corporation law is
reducing ‘agency costs’ by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders’ interests”);
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1624
(2015) (“[S]hareholders’ ability to minimize managerial agency costs is one of the most important
challenges in the corporate governance of widely held firms.”). Berle and Means first observed that
the separation of ownership from control in the public corporation had the potential to generate
managerial opportunism and reduce firm value. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84–89 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. reprt. ed.
1982) (1932). Jensen and Meckling later formalized the intuition, identifying managerial moral
hazard as the primary agency cost arising from the information asymmetry between insiders and
shareholders. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
6. See, e.g., Jay B. Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder Bylaw Power,
85 TEMP. L. REV. 485, 486–87 (2013) (describing corporate bylaws “like hostile takeovers, deal
protection devices, and proxy access fights before them—the new leading edge of a decades-long
struggle between shareholders and management over the allocation of decision-making authority in
public companies”); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65
STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (2013) (discussing the long-term battle between shareholders and
managers and suggesting that in recent years shareholders seem to have gained the upper hand in
this battle).
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information and insights to operational decision-making.7 In other words,
increasingly, the insider–shareholder dynamic in the modern corporation is
collaborative.
Insider–shareholder collaboration is occurring in multiple ways—
through private engagement between large shareholders and corporate
executives and directors, through joint initiatives aimed at developing and
promoting the spread of shared governance principles, through
“constructivist” activist interventions oriented to the creation of long-term
value, and through the increasing use of hybrid boards of directors to
formalize shareholder inputs over operational decision-making. Although we
do not claim that collaboration has displaced hostile activism, we document
how the trend toward board–shareholder collaboration is spreading rapidly
and systemically.8
What explains the growth of collaboration? Using insights from
epistemic models of collective wisdom and the economics of information,
this Article demonstrates that collaboration promotes the production and
aggregation of the “partial” and “complementary” information that insiders
and shareholders are likely to possess in today’s knowledge-rich economy.
Because of this distinctive property, collaboration offers a mechanism for
enhancing firm value that unilateral decision-making by either insiders or
shareholders cannot provide.
The Article also explains how this mechanism can be traced back to the
venture capital (VC) context, in which founders and investors have longdeveloped structures that promote shared power and joint decision-making—
collaborating with rather than competing against each other. Indeed, in the
VC context, which emphasizes innovation and rapid growth, the traditional
corporate law concern of minimizing agency costs is secondary to what we
call “partial information” problems.9 These problems arise when the nature

7. We distinguish collaboration from communication in that it involves shareholders and
insiders working together rather than simply exchanging information. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1994, at 96, 97
(defining collaboration as “creating new value together”); see also Debra Mashek, Collaboration:
It’s Not What You Think, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/
intl/blog/relationships-intimate-and-more/201602/collaboration-its-not-what-you-think?amp
[https://perma.cc/6HJF-AVAJ] (distinguishing collaboration from networking, coordinating, and
cooperating).
8. One article suggests that the relationship between activists and targeted companies is moving
toward a “new, collaborative (or at least less adversarial) conception,” but the analysis is largely
limited to the hedge fund context and to the implication for golden leash practices. Gregory H. Shill,
The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1256–59, 1261–64
(2017). In contrast, this Article examines the potential for a broader-scope collaborative model of
the insider–shareholder relationship.
9. Asymmetric information no longer is only “unilateral,” with outsiders necessarily standing
at an informational disadvantage relative to insiders, but is increasingly “bilateral,” with both
insiders and outsiders holding private information not available to the other party. See Frederik
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of the production process is so knowledge intensive that a single individual
or groups of individuals—including the firm’s founders, officers, and
directors—is unlikely to possess the relevant information to respond
effectively to all business challenges. Instead, both insiders and outsiders—
such as VC funds—likely possess information that is not available to the
other party but is vital to the firm’s success. VC firms access these different
sets of information through collaborative decision-making structures.
Two factors explain the spread of collaboration to the publicly traded
firm. First, the information dependency of the public firm business model has
increased as new technology firms enter the public markets and older firms
modernize their business plans. Second, the rise of empowered and actively
informed investors offers a new source of well-resourced and sophisticated
firm-specific knowledge from outside the corporation. Growing market
concentration has led to the emergence of institutional investors with large
stakes and both the incentive and sophistication to acquire valuable
information.10 These investors have increasingly come to resemble VC
investors in that they are likely to possess information that is not just different
but also “complementary” to that of insiders. This means that the
informational whole of insider and outsider information is arguably greater
than the sum of its individual parts so that the aggregation of this information
adds to firm value. It follows that public firms have begun to incorporate both
the inside information of insiders and the outside knowledge of investors—
similar to what happens in the VC context.
Despite these dramatic transformations, corporate law scholars have
paid virtually no attention to insider–shareholder collaboration. This Article
attempts to remedy the gap. As a descriptive matter, it offers the first
taxonomy of the various forms of collaboration that we increasingly observe
in corporate practice. It then draws on the theory of cooperative games to
demonstrate how the corporate structure provides appropriate incentives for
the generation and aggregation of partial and complementary information.
First, the equity contract efficiently addresses collaboration’s economic
rights by ensuring that the surplus created by collaboration is shared by both
collaborating and noncollaborating investors, as well as equity-compensated
managers. Second, the corporate structure efficiently allows parties to design
control rights so as to reflect a party’s marginal contribution to the surplus
created by collaboration, preserving the incentives to invest optimally in the
production of complementary information and the collaborative process more
generally.
Andersson, Adverse Selection and Bilateral Asymmetric Information, 74 J. ECON. 173, 174–75
(2001) (examining bilateral asymmetric information in the insurance context). For clarity, this
Article uses the term “partial information” in the place of “bilateral asymmetric information.”
10. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Reconcentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017)
(documenting the growth and increasing ownership concentration of large-asset managers).
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Corporate law rules are poorly prepared to handle insider–shareholder
collaboration, however. These rules typically limit shareholders to
communicating information to insiders rather than collaborating.11 Although
board representation offers public company shareholders a vehicle to
collaborate, shareholder representatives face questions about the scope of
their fiduciary duties and the potential for conflicts of interest. Effective
collaboration may also result in greater shareholder access to firm-specific
information, but with that access comes concerns over the misuse of that
information, either to obtain a trading advantage or for other forms of selfdealing. Finally, collaboration creates the possibility of collusion in which
collaborating investors and insiders act opportunistically to further their own
interests at the expense of overall firm value. Although a complete analysis
of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, we argue that the way
in which they are treated under current corporate law rules should be
rethought if the goal is enabling productive collaboration while limiting the
potential for abuse.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the traditional
confrontational model of corporate law. Part II describes the shift from
confrontation to collaboration and explains how collaboration has migrated
from the VC context to the publicly traded company, providing a first
taxonomy of the several forms of insider–shareholder collaboration. Part III
defends the normative desirability of the collaborative model, explaining how
collaboration responds to a growing partial information problem and using
insights from game theory to demonstrate how the corporate form can
preserve the individual incentives of insiders and shareholders to collaborate.
Part IV identifies how the collaborative model presents new challenges for
corporate law.
I.

Confrontational Theories of the Firms
Traditional “confrontational” models of the corporation assume that the
essential task of corporate law is devising the appropriate allocation of power
between insiders and shareholders to minimize the cost of managerial moral
hazard. Although commentators differ in their views as to the appropriate
allocation of such power—with some supporting managerial primacy and
others favoring empowered shareholders—the dominant narrative in either
case is that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a competitive struggle
for corporate power.

11. See infra section IV(A)(1).
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A.

The Management-Power Model
The traditional management-power model, reflected in the writings of
Martin Lipton,12 Stephen Bainbridge,13 and the Delaware courts,14 relies on
the board of directors to centralize corporate decision-making authority and
to address the problem of managerial moral hazard. The model “free[s] up
managers to manage.”15 Shareholders, in this model, specialize in riskbearing but are not involved in operational issues.16 The key arguments for
granting ultimate authority to the board include not only shareholder
collective action problems and asymmetric information but also concerns
about shareholder short-termism, self-dealing, and conflicts of interest.17
This account of the corporation finds its roots in the managerialist era
that began at the end of World War II and ended around 1980.18 The
managers that oversaw the growth of the modern industrial corporation were
brought in to “hire capital from the investor”19 and enjoyed a nonreviewable
power of fiat.20 Shareholders, on the other hand, were dispersed and passive,
with few mechanisms to overcome collective action problems, and hence
dismissed as mere capital providers.21 Even back then, as attested by Berle’s
and Means’s classic treatise,22 management power was seen as problematic,

12. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L.
REV. 733, 757–58 (2007) (defining the “the director-centric Delaware way”); Martin Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130–31 (1979) (defending board
power in the takeover context).
13. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560, 569 (describing the board’s exclusive authority
as its undisturbed “power of fiat”).
14. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive
It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657–61 (2011) (attributing national economic decline to,
among other causes, the erosion of board power); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate
Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1763 (2006) (explaining that the traditionalist Delaware way is “the
empowerment of centralized management to make and pursue risky business decisions through
diverse means”).
15. Strine, supra note 14, at 1764.
16. Fama & Jensen, supra note 3, at 309.
17. See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 12, at 744–47 (explaining dangers of conflicts of interest
from interest-group shareholders and short-termism caused by vocal, institutional shareholders);
Strine, supra note 14, at 1764 (describing traditional managerialist’s concern for selfish interests of
institutional investors).
18. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 482–83 (1977) (describing the managerial revolution);
GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS 72–77 (2009) (describing managerial dominance
during this period).
19. Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489 (1958).
20. See ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 169–70 (1963) (noting that
before 1920 “owner-managers considered their prerogatives absolute”).
21. Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY,
at vii, xxvi–vii (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932).
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 207.
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but under the Coasian assumption that the market could not provide an
environment conducive to complex production,23 it was deemed unavoidable.
Since the early 1980s, however, a variety of developments have limited
the scope of management power. The hostile takeover offered, for the first
time, a vehicle through which capital market discipline could be used to
constrain managerial agency costs by demonstrating the transformative
potential of shareholders’ stock market purchasing power.24 And after the
demise of takeovers, the rise of institutional investors and governance
watchdogs intervened to provide a novel form of market discipline.25 The
introduction of incentive compensation also increased the alignment between
managers’ interests and maximization of firm value.26 And the emergence of
independent directors led to greater monitoring of managers.27
For management-power supporters, these developments heighten
arguments to defend the model by providing incentives for managers to focus
on the maximization of firm value and hold them accountable for doing so.
These scholars also see these developments as strengthening the case for
protecting management and the board from the potential interference of lessinformed investors.28 Not so for the defendants of the competing shareholderpower model, as we shall see next.
B.

The Shareholder-Power Model

The rise of the shareholder-power model can be traced back to the
emergence of hostile takeovers. Indeed, takeovers led to a new way of
thinking about the corporation, one largely shaped by the rise of the
neoclassical theory of the firm. Rejecting centralized decision-making as a

23. See Coase, supra note 1, at 392 (explaining that use of the firm can reduce the transaction
costs associated with market transactions).
24. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1520–21 (1989) (describing the takeovers that arose in the
1980s as “capital markets’ successful demand for the return of capital suboptimally invested”).
25. David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 592–93 (2005).
26. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884, 896–97 (2002) (describing
both the rise of incentive compensation and independent directors as adaptive responses to the
managerial-friendly takeover standards set by Delaware courts).
27. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518 (2007) (defending
the increased use of independent directors as a value-increasing innovation of the post-takeover
era); see also Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270–71 (1997)
(describing the rise of the monitoring board).
28. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 455 (2014)
(describing the view of some commentators that “the best way to ensure that corporations generate
wealth for diversified stockholders is to give the managers of corporations a strong hand to take
risks and implement business strategies without constant disruption by shifting stock market
sentiment”).
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distinctive trait of totalitarianism,29 neoclassicists viewed the firm as a web
of contractual relationships among individuals, whose ongoing transactions
were efficiently coordinated by the price mechanism.30 The introduction by
Jensen and Meckling of the principal–agent model of the firm formalized and
directed the change of approach.31 Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s contractarianism refined the model for corporate law, using it to support a
sequence of normative assertions that revolved around a view of shareholders
as the primary corporate constituents.32
The shareholders’ claim to primacy was put to test in the wake of the
fall of the hostile takeover and the introduction of legal and governance
responses empowering incumbent managers to adopt antitakeover
measures.33 These reforms prompted commentators fiercely to debate
whether management’s use of antitakeover measures was appropriate or
whether management should instead remain passive and allow shareholders
the freedom to decide whether to accept a hostile bid.34 The scene was set for
the battle between shareholders and managers over corporate control.
That battle intensified in the early 2000s, when the case for shareholder
primacy expanded beyond the control contest. Lucian Bebchuk was perhaps
the most vocal commentator to argue that shareholders should be given
greater power, including powers that were currently reserved to corporate
insiders.35 In recent years, steady increases in shareholder concentration and
activism have led to greater shareholder control over corporate decisionmaking and increased issuer responsiveness to shareholder demands. As put
by one commentator, for the first time since the beginning of the battle

29. See DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 87–88 (2006)
(describing the role of totalitarianism in mid-twentieth-century American views on economic
reform).
30. Armen A. Alchian, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, in
ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 73, 73–74 (1977).
31. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5.
32. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
33. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 864–65 (1993) (describing the legal and
political barriers as resulting in the “demise of the market for corporate control”); see also Bengt
Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States:
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 121, 132 (examining the
changed landscape for takeovers and mergers and suggesting “anti-takeover legislation has had an
effect”).
34. Compare Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural
Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 821–22 (1982) (criticizing the use of
antitakeover defenses), with Lipton, supra note 12, at 130–31 (defending the use of antitakeover
defenses to protect board primacy).
35. See supra note 4.
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between shareholders and insiders over corporate power, the battle has come
to favor shareholders rather than directors and managers.36
C.

The “Battle” Between Insiders and Shareholders
Both the management-power model and the shareholder-power model
assume that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a competitive struggle
for corporate power. The language of combat goes back to the “takeover
battles” of the 1970s, which featured “corporate raiders,” “white knights,”
“scorched earth takeover defenses,” “poison pills,” and “greenmail.”37
Although the conflicts between shareholders and insiders today rarely
involve hostile contests for corporate control, the struggle for corporate
power has, if possible, intensified. Hostile activists have taken the place of
corporate raiders, and the ongoing engagement between activists and issuers
continues to be described as a “war.”38
The language of combat persists. A white paper directed at corporate
boards, for example, termed majority voting “the next battleground in the
corporate governance wars between the activist institutional shareholder
community and ‘Corporate America.’”39 Similarly, Fortune magazine
described Trian’s recent activist campaign at DuPont as “war.”40 A letter sent
to American CEOs by Blackrock’s Larry Fink in 2014 expressed concerns
that activists are out to “destroy jobs.”41 And Delaware Supreme Court Chief
Justice Leo Strine’s recent essay describes activist “wolf packs” and asked,
“Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?”42
The confrontational approach is likewise reflected in the
characterization of the objectives of each model. Adherents to the
management-power model defend it in terms of the need to protect the

36. Klausner, supra note 6, at 1329 (“In recent years, however, the balance of power seems to
have shifted toward shareholders. After a thirty-year delay, and key changes in the background law,
governance structures that shareholders advocate have been adopted.”).
37. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 34, at 775–76 (describing target management tactics as
“drawing directly on military jargon”).
38. Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton’s War on Hedge Fund Activists, AM. LAW. (Mar. 30,
2015), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202721058301/ [https://perma.cc/77PUHZ3T].
39. Majority Voting for Directors: The Latest Corporate Governance Initiative, LATHAM &
WATKINS: M&A DEAL COMMENT. (Dec. 9, 2005), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/
pub1437_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU4X-GVQA].
40. Stephen Gandel, DuPont Nearly Lost Its War with Activist Nelson Peltz, FORTUNE (June 4,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/04/dupont-nelson-peltz-vote/ [https://perma.cc/QE2K-2B9K].
41. William Alden, Laurence Fink Says Activist Investing Can ‘Destroy Jobs,’ N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Dec. 11, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/laurence-fink-says-activistinvesting-can-destroy-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9VJM-NSA4] (quoting comments by Mr. Fink at a
DealBook conference).
42. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1875
(2017).
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corporation from the short-term interests of activist shareholders.43 And
shareholder advocates persevere in their call to increase shareholder power
to reduce managerial agency costs.44 In other words, both sides view the
preservation of power as necessary to curb the tendencies of the opposition
to destroy or appropriate firm value.
It is a mistake to conclude, however, that a confrontational model is an
inherent feature of corporate law. Black letter corporate law—whether
statutory or case law—merely provides a starting point for managing the
insider–shareholder relationship. Corporations respond to economic and
legal developments through private ordering,45 adopting contractually based
adjustments to statutory default terms and changing external circumstances.
This adjustment process has accommodated collaborative, in addition to
confrontational, interactions between shareholders and corporate insiders,
most notably in the venture capital context. Most importantly, as we will
show below, the changes that have occurred in corporate production and the
role of shareholders have prompted the adoption of similar collaborative
structures in an increasing number of public corporations in recent years,
denuding confrontational models of their descriptive value.
II.

From Confrontation to Collaboration

A.

Venture Capital and the Emergence of Collaboration

Consistent with adversarial theories of the corporation, confrontational
corporate governance arrangements provide for unilateral power, by either
the board or the shareholders. In the managerialist era, for example,
corporations reflected unilateral managerial power. At the opposite extreme,
we find the hostile-activist context, in which hedge funds, as empowered
shareholders, can often shape a firm’s business policy unilaterally. A
confrontational allocation of corporate power is not the sole possibility,
however. Corporate law structures insider and shareholder inputs, but it does
not dictate the details of this process; those details are left to private ordering.
And under private ordering, collaboration is an alternative to confrontation.

43. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093–96 (2015) (providing an overview of the scholarly positions defending
what they refer to as the “myopic-activists claim”).
44. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643–44 (2013) (rejecting the claim that shareholder activism promotes
short-termism).
45. Private ordering occupies the space of contractual freedom that is available under default
rules and encompasses both contracting within the corporation and discrete market contracting. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426
(1989) (describing the corporation as “a set of implicit and explicit contracts”).
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VC firms offer the paradigmatic example of the collaborative
alternative.46 VC founders and investors routinely bargain for structures that
provide for shared power and joint decision-making rather than unilateral
decision-making authority by either insiders or investors.47 We argue that
these collaborative structures respond to a distinctive feature of VC firms:
the fact that they are typically invested in innovation and high growth.48 As
Ron Gilson has explained, various features of VC-funded start-up firms make
them particularly conducive to innovation.49 And innovative businesses are
heavily dependent on information—both information about the firm’s
business model, invention, or technology, and information about the
relationship of the firm’s innovation to the existing industry. In such cases,
both entrepreneurs and investors suffer from “partial information” problems;
each is likely to possess valuable private information for matching firmspecific innovation to the surrounding business environment, but only when
that information is combined can it be fully exploited to foster a firm’s
success.
VC firms address this problem through collaborative decision-making
structures that create incentives for all participants to develop and aggregate
their partial information. Staged financing, the explicit provisions of joint
control rights, and the appointment of constituency directors all offer
examples of these collaborative structures.
Staged financing provides for the incremental investment of capital over
time, typically conditional on how a start-up progresses in relation to its

46. Additional, although less salient, evidence of collaborative practices comes from incentivebased management compensation and independent directors. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1471
(observing that independent directors can not only channel shareholder inputs but can also credibly
check these inputs against insider measures of firm prospects); Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at
884, 896–97 (describing increased use of incentive compensation in response to takeover barriers).
47. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 920 (2002) (describing “shared control structure’s real
world dominance over the alternative of VC control or hardwired control transfers”); Ronald J.
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1067, 1081 (2003) (“The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract stands the BerleMeans problem on its head.”); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information
Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 139 (1998) (describing the relationship between VC
investors and entrepreneurs as a “cooperative relationship”).
48. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 47, at 1068 (“The venture capital market thus provides a unique
link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms––organizational forms
particularly well-suited to innovation––with capital market access that is tailored to the special task
of financing these high-risk, high-return activities.”).
49. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational
Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 900–04 (2010) (arguing that VCfunded firms are well suited for dealing with high levels of risk); see also Elizabeth Pollman &
Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (2017) (observing that
the success of many innovative firms involves regulatory entrepreneurship, which they define as
pursuing a line of business that depends on changing the applicable law).
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initial projection.50 Two collaborative features are inherent in this
mechanism. First, staged financing necessarily presupposes an ongoing
relationship between the investors and the entrepreneur that involves regular
rather than sporadic communications as well as periodic consultation.51
Indeed, only through frequent interactive exchanges with the entrepreneur
can VC investors acquire the information needed to employ staged financing
successfully as a means to minimize their investment risk.52 Second, staged
financing implicitly provides for shared decision-making power between the
investors and the entrepreneur. It does so by ensuring that decision-making
power rests with the entrepreneur until it becomes optimal for this power to
shift to the investors, enabling them to reclaim further authority through their
control of subsequent funding.53
VC contracts also typically provide for joint decision-making rights
rather than vesting operational decision-making exclusively in the hands of
either insiders or investors. For example, VC contracts frequently allocate
control and monitoring rights to VC investors that are disproportionate to
their equity share.54 VC investors also usually enjoy veto powers over
fundamental corporate decisions so that crucial actions in the development
of a start-up business require the consensus of both the entrepreneur and the
investors.55
Further, VC contracts routinely feature the appointment of constituency
directors.56 Constituency directors are directors whose election to the board
50. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006); Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and
Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163, 1169–70 (2013).
51. In the jargon of economists, staged financing presupposes a relational contract; that is, an
agreement characterized by continuing interactive exchanges between the contracting parties. See
generally Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (2003)
(discussing the structure of relational contracts).
52. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 50, at 52 (explaining that staged financing allows VC investors
to minimize the risk of investing in unfamiliar businesses by allowing them to observe progress);
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture
Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 65 (positing that staged financing reduces the risk
to investments by an entrepreneur’s threat to quit the venture and from informational hazards).
53. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323 (2005).
Typically, control stays in the hands of the entrepreneur when the firm is in a “good” state of nature
and transfers to the VC investor in a “bad” state of nature. Id. at 322. Importantly, as compared to
the unilateral allocation of control power to either the entrepreneur or the investor, this allocation
of power prevents the entrepreneur from seeking to continue a business when exit is optimal, while
also avoiding an investor moving too quickly to abandon a business. Id. at 318.
54. Bartlett, supra note 50, at 53–54 (“A VC investor . . . [will] negotiat[e] control and
monitoring rights that are disproportionate to its stock ownership.”).
55. Id. at 54 (“[A] VC investor will commonly have veto rights over the issuance of securities,
asset sales, mergers, or other important corporate transactions.”).
56. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2006) (focusing on the appointment of directors by venture
capitalists); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
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is traceable to an identified corporate constituency. In the VC context,
constituency directors typically represent the VC investors.57 Although the
fiduciary duty implications of constituency directors are debated in the
literature,58 their appointment is designed to facilitate joint decision-making
by allowing investors to engage in a deliberative process with the
entrepreneur.59
While scholars have attempted to shoehorn these arrangements into the
traditional confrontational paradigm, many features of VC contracting are
inconsistent with the traditional agency-cost model.60 As observed by Gordon
Smith, the relationship between the VC investors and the entrepreneur
involves “a more complex interaction characterized by give-and-take on both
sides.”61 In a pure agency relationship, the principal’s only obligation is
providing pecuniary compensation for the agent’s services. Venture
capitalists tend to provide more than that. They provide a whole series of
“value-added services,” such as “identifying and evaluating business
opportunities, including management, entry, or growth strategies; negotiating
and closing the investment; tracking and coaching the company; providing
technical and management assistance; and attracting additional capital,
directors, management, suppliers, and other key stakeholders and
resources.”62 Because of these added services, the success of a start-up is as
likely to depend on the business expertise of sophisticated VC investors as
on the entrepreneur’s human capital.
VC contracting recognizes the value of the contributions by both the
entrepreneur-insider and the VC investors by adopting a model of shared
decision-making. A collaborative governance model is better situated than a
confrontational one to promote conditions that facilitate the development and
aggregation of the valuable firm-specific information of both the
entrepreneur and the investors. As we shall see next, the changes that have
occurred in corporate production and the role of shareholders have
increasingly blurred the line between the VC context and the public-

World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 308–10
(2003) (empirically analyzing board composition in VC contracts); see also Brian J. Broughman,
The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 462 (discussing the
use of third-party independent directors in start-up firms).
57. Fried & Ganor, supra note 56, at 988 (observing that the link between a constituency
director and the VC investors may be more or less explicit).
58. See Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91
WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 342–50 (2013) (discussing the relevant case law).
59. See id. at 335–37, 340–41 (arguing that constituency directors offer a way to complete the
necessary incomplete contracts of venture capitalists and other investors).
60. See Bartlett, supra note 50, at 57–58 (identifying features of VC contracting that cannot be
explained in terms of agency costs).
61. Smith, supra note 47, at 139.
62. Id. at 134 (quoting WILLIAM D. BYGRAVE & JEFFRY A. TIMMONS, VENTURE CAPITAL AT
THE CROSSROADS 13 (1992)).
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corporation context, with the result that many public corporations are also
moving from a confrontational model to a collaborative one.
B.

The Extension of Collaboration to the Public Corporation
Insider–shareholder collaboration has spread from the VC context to
publicly traded firms. Three factors explain this development. First, public
firms have become more dependent on the information-intensive
environment that has traditionally been the province of start-ups. Second, the
shareholder base of public companies is now dominated by large institutional
shareholders who are devoting growing sophistication and resources to
understanding and engaging with their portfolio companies. As a result, these
investors offer firms new sources of information. Third, the modern publiccompany board consists, almost entirely, of independent directors, creating
an information challenge for unilateral board decision-making.
1. Partial Information Problem and the Public Corporation.—
Corporate production has undergone a vast transformation in the last thirty to
forty years.63 In the industrial age, corporations derived most of their value
from physical assets and manufacturing activities. In the twenty-first-century
corporation, instead, firm value increasingly depends on intangible assets,
such as technological know-how, patents, research-and-development
projects, brand names, and trade secrets.64 Along the same lines, human
capital has also become a specialized resource.65 Successful corporations
today are defined by their ability to access, transfer, and assemble specific
knowledge. While one may think of the shift to intangible “knowledge”
assets as a process that only affects new economy companies, such as Google,
Facebook, Apple, and Tesla, in reality, information increasingly is the key
63. See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 99, 100 (2010) (“[T]he recent technological
revolution, in its various manifestations, is associated with a dramatic shift in the composition of
investment spending and in the factors driving the growth of output per worker hour.” (emphasis
omitted)).
64. As explained by Carol Corrado and Charles Hulten:
[T]he innovation that has shaped recent economic growth is not an autonomous event
that falls like manna from heaven. Nor is it a result of R&D and ICT investments alone.
Instead, a surge of new ideas (technological or otherwise) is linked to output growth
through a complex process of investments in technological expertise, product design,
market development, and organizational capability. This process affects all sources of
growth to one extent or another but is most clearly detected in the growing contribution
of intangible capital.
Id. at 103.
65. See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee
Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 622, 627–29 (2011) (“I find a strong, robust,
positive correlation between [employee] satisfaction and shareholder returns. This result provides
empirical support for recent theories of the firm focused on employees as the key assets . . . .”
(citations omitted)); Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1641–42 (2000)
(emphasizing the importance of human capital over physical capital in today’s corporations).
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driver to success across industries.66 Moreover, generating and exploiting
knowledge demands that knowledge be continually replenished.
As a result, the informational structure of the public corporation has
become more complex than reflected in the traditional models of the
corporation. Under those models, information issues only mattered in
connection to moral hazard and other agency costs, in the form of an
asymmetric information problem between insiders and investors. The
normative task was then to determine the appropriate balance of shareholder
and insider power to limit managerial moral hazard without sacrificing
efficient operational decision-making. A presumption about the
confrontational nature of the insider–shareholder relationship logically
followed.
In today’s knowledge-rich economy, however, asymmetric information
issues only partially capture the relevance of information for the theory of the
firm. Indeed, in this economy, “partial information” problems are likely to
matter as much as, if not more than, asymmetric information problems for
firm value. As economist Harold Demsetz observed, although information
has obvious connections to moral hazard and agency costs, information costs
play a bigger role in the theory of the firm.67 Changes in corporate production
and the role of shareholders have increased this role. Successful corporations
are defined today by the ability to bring together the vast quantities of
information necessary for the production of “‘knowledge’ assets”68—ideas
linked to “investments in technological expertise, product design, market
development, and organizational capability.”69 In this environment,
Demsetz’s remark that “[e]conomic organization, including the firm, must
reflect the fact that knowledge is costly to produce, maintain, and use”70 has
never been more to the point.

66. See Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRIT. ACAD. 53, 54 (2016) (stating that
80% of the market value of U.S. corporations is nowadays represented by intangible assets).
67. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 141 (1988).
Studies on the issue of the production, aggregation, and dissemination of information within
organizations date back to the pioneering work of Simon, Polanyi, and von Mises. See MICHAEL
POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 69–71 (Harper Torchbook ed., Harper & Row 1964) (1958)
(discussing the concept of tacit or personal knowledge—things that we may know but find
impossible to completely and effectively communicate to others); HERBERT A. SIMON,
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 72–73 (3d ed. 1976) (focusing on the issue of the difficulties and costs
associated with transferring information within firms and in markets); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN
ACTION 648–50 (1949) (discussing the period of time between changes in market data and the point
where the market is adjusted); see also Utset, supra note 52, at 73–76 (providing an overview of the
relevant literature). Over time, however, the study of informational issues in corporate governance
has lost its initial general relevance and become limited to matters connected with agency costs.
68. BIG INNOVATION CTR., THE PURPOSEFUL COMPANY: INTERIM REPORT 5 (2016),
http://www.biginnovationcentre-purposeful-company.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
thepurposefulcompany_interimreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK3D-LBNG].
69. Corrado & Hulten, supra note 63, at 103.
70. Demsetz, supra note 67, at 157.
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Partial information problems have now transferred to the public
corporation because the modern corporation’s operational complexity makes
it highly unlikely that any single individual or organization will possess the
relevant information “to respond effectively to all business challenges.”71
Rather, information tends to be scattered through a multitude of agents,
requiring corporate actors to leverage and pull knowledge from multiple
sources. Adding to this informational complexity, the rise of sophisticated
and actively informed investors suggests that these investors are increasingly
likely to have the capacity to gather relevant knowledge—knowledge that
board members may not necessarily share.
Under these different informational assumptions, the normative
necessity of a confrontational corporate paradigm disappears. The task is no
longer only to determine the appropriate balance of shareholder and manager
power to limit managerial moral hazard but also to determine the best way to
aggregate the partial information of corporate insiders and shareholders. The
increased use of collaborative schemes that we observe in public corporations
suggests that these schemes can pursue this task better than traditional
competitive schemes.
2. Empowered and Informed Investors.—Capital market developments
make it increasingly rational to look to public-company shareholders as
sources of valuable information. Modern shareholders no longer fit Berle and
Means’s account.72 They have instead become empowered, largely because
of the reconcentration of equity ownership,73 which has increased since the
1990s.74 Institutional investors now own over two-thirds of the outstanding
shares of the thousand largest U.S. public companies.75 These investors vary
in their characteristics—ranging from passive mutual funds that select stocks
according to a broad market index to hedge funds whose business model is
predicated on identifying companies that they believe underperform industry
peers and forcing changes from the inside that can improve corporate
performance. In spite of these differences, however, institutional investors of
all types have grown increasingly informed as well as increasingly engaged
in their portfolio companies.
Similar to VC investors, today’s institutional investors bring their
knowledge of the market rather than just capital to firms. Hedge funds
specialize in developing firm-specific information that they then deploy by

71. BIG INNOVATION CTR., supra note 68, at 6 (emphasis added).
72. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013).
73. Other crucial changes occurred in the marketplace including the emergence of proxy
advisory firms, the adoption of universal majority voting, and accompanying withhold campaigns.
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 987, 995, 1010–11 (2010).
74. Id. at 996.
75. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 865.
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providing governance and strategic inputs to the firms they target.76 In
selecting targets and devising future investment strategies, the funds employ
teams of dedicated analysts who pore over financial documents, engage with
both the company’s existing investors and competitors, and often visit
potential targets to gather as much information as possible.77 Hedge funds
also tend to specialize in certain industries or sectors of an industry, around
which they build a strong expertise and develop network contacts.78
Large institutional investors such as mutual funds are also increasingly
engaged in information production and no longer just as “reticent” supporters
of initiatives undertaken by activist hedge funds.79 Asset managers like
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street¾whose combined holdings make
them the largest shareholder in 40% of all U.S. listed companies80¾have
both the resources and the incentives to develop governance sophistication
and expertise.81 Many large institutional investors also have in-house teams
that are dedicated to gathering governance information and investment
insights and formulating policies ranging from board composition to risk
management.82
Collectively, these developments stand in sharp contrast to the
traditional management-power claim that because shareholders are poorly
informed they should play a limited role in corporate decision-making. At the
same time, the developing skills and inputs of today’s shareholders extend
far beyond the shareholder-power claim for increased monitoring.
Shareholders also provide crucial informational inputs, inputs that, as we
shall see next, the modern independent board may be unable to provide.
3. Independent Directors and Information Access.—The final
development that explains the extension of collaboration to the modern
public company is the rise of the independent board. The percentage of
independent directors on corporate boards has steadily increased since the

76. Id. at 897.
77. OWEN WALKER, BARBARIANS IN THE BOARDROOM 31 (2016).
78. See id. at 11–21 (discussing the different business models of major hedge fund players).
79. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 867 (describing institutional investors as “rationally
reticent”).
80. If we restrict the field to the largest 500 American corporations, share ownership by the
“Big Three” (i.e., BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) amounts to an astonishing 88%. Fichtner
et al., supra note 10, at 313. The rise of the Big Three is explained by the massive shift from active
toward passive investment strategies, which began after the financial crisis. Id. at 302–03. Unlike
active funds, passive “index” funds replicate existing stock indices by buying shares of the member
firms of a particular index. BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street largely dominate the passive
index fund industry, collectively managing over 90% of all assets under management in passive
equity funds. Id. at 299, 304.
81. Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street:
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 49 (2019).
82. See id. at 25 (describing increased engagement of the Big Three with portfolio companies).
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aftermath of the takeover era83 as a result of various mechanisms that have
transformed the independent or “monitoring” board into a virtually
mandatory element of the law.84 Most U.S. boards now consist largely of
outsiders with full-time jobs elsewhere who can devote only limited time to
the running of the business for which they act as directors.85 The outpouring
of new regulation resulting from the financial crises of the last decade also
claims a significant portion of that time, limiting the time that independent
directors can spend on information gathering and business decisionmaking.86
In addition, the standards for independence have become increasingly
stringent, so much so that, according to some commentators, they “rule[] out
just about anybody who has firsthand knowledge of the company and its
industry.”87 The emphasis placed on independence requirements can indeed
have the effect of sacrificing expertise by disqualifying directors based on
their firm or industry ties.88 The result is that many independent directors lack
the firm-specific human capital, knowledge, and skills of executive directors
and tend instead to be “generalists.”89 In the best-case scenario, independent
directors develop firm-specific expertise over a lengthy process.90 In the
worst-case scenario, they never “develop . . . more than a rudimentary
understanding of their companies’ workings.”91
The extent to which these developments limit the information available
to modern public-company boards is unclear.92 At a minimum, however,
increased director independence suggests that while a board of directors is
likely to continue to retain access to unique inside information, it seems
factually obsolete to assume that the board cannot benefit from the different
information that today’s empowered shareholders may bring to the corporate
decision-making process.
83. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1475 (noting that between 1950 and 2005, the percentage of
independent directors increased from approximately 20% to 75%).
84. Among others, these mechanisms include stock-exchange listing standards mandating
director independence, Delaware courts’ requirements, and pressure from corporate governance
reformers¾first “as part of the post-hostile bid settlement among institutional investors, managers,
and boards” of the 1990s and then in the aftermath of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. Id.
at 1468, 1477.
85. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064–65 (2014).
86. Id.
87. COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 45 (2004).
88. Cf. Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript
at 2–3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438281 [https://perma.cc/EBG6RDU9] (arguing that current and former directorships in the same industry may have
anticompetitive effects).
89. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 85, at 1066.
90. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 87, at 45.
91. Id.
92. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 85, at 1065–66 (noting the various reasons for
information asymmetry between independent directors and inside managers).
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C.

A Taxonomy of Shareholder Collaboration
Both large institutional investors (such as mutual funds and pension
funds) and hedge funds increasingly engage in collaboration with corporate
insiders. Conceptually, however, collaboration differs between these two
investor groups. Hedge funds tend to engage in firm-specific operational
collaboration through the proposal of business-strategy initiatives and often
appoint one or more activist directors to supervise the implementation of
those initiatives. Large institutional investors collaborate in ways that scale
across multiple companies and broad themes, including takeover defenses,
executive compensation structures, public policy issues, and regulatory
matters.
Further, the spectrum of shareholder collaboration presents significant
variation. Collaboration can take place both within and outside the
institutional structure of the corporation, have an explicit or implicit
contractual nature, and be advisory or binding. Collaboration thus emerges
as a “continuous,” rather than a “binary” choice.93 This subpart examines the
spectrum of shareholder collaboration and highlights some recent examples.
1. Hedge Funds and Constructivist Activism.—Activist hedge funds are
usually portrayed as the prototypical corporate adversaries who seek to wrest
board control, replace existing management, and engineer a structural or
operational change. Yet hostile campaigns are not the exclusive form of
hedge fund activism. Instead, the structure of these campaigns varies,
sometimes substantially, depending on the fund’s specific business model
and temperament of its managers; the target’s response; whether the fund
seeks the replacement of the entire board or, more typically, only a partial
slate; and whether it can count on the support of the company’s institutional
investors.94 In particular, hedge funds are increasingly embracing a more
“constructivist,” longer-term kind of activism.95
A constructivist activist, as put by Leo Strine:
may need to knock a bit loudly, but once let in, assumes the duties and
economic consequences of becoming a genuine fiduciary with duties
to other stockholders and of holding its position for a period of five to
ten years, during which it is a constructive participant in helping the
rest of the board and management improve a lagging company.96

93. A binary choice is one where the alternatives are yes or no, acceptance or rejection. A
continuous choice, instead, is one between a set of differently preferred alternatives. See, e.g.,
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 213–14 (1978) (providing
examples of common binary-choice problems).
94. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 30–37 (describing the typical structure of activist
campaigns).
95. See id. at 13–17 (describing strategies of Nelson Peltz, Ralph Whitworth, and Jeffrey
Ubben, all of whom practice a collaborative form of activism).
96. Strine, supra note 42, at 1908.
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Constructivist activism is best understood as shareholder collaboration.
A constructivist hedge fund combines industry knowledge with a deep dive
into firm-specific information, researching its target and developing a
strategic agenda. The hedge fund typically incorporates this research into a
detailed presentation or white paper that communicates the hedge fund’s
information both to the board and to other shareholders.97 Whether through a
short-slate-election contest or, more commonly, a settlement agreement, the
hedge fund obtains board representation and uses that representation to work
within the existing board to oversee the incorporation of its information into
operational decisions for the purpose of improving firm performance.98
Viewed through this lens, the rise of settlement agreements granting the
activist negotiated board representation is an important component of the
shift from confrontation to collaboration.99 The number of activist
representatives serving as directors continues to grow—activists obtained
616 board seats since 2013.100 Only a small percentage of these directors
obtained their positions through full election contests; most activist
representatives obtained board seats through a negotiation with the issuer
outside the proxy-contest process.101 Activists obtained more board seats in
the first quarter of 2018 than all of 2017.102 Moreover, more than 85% of the
seats in Q1 2018 were obtained by settlement rather than through a proxy
fight.103

97. See, e.g., Hedge Funds, SAVVY INVESTOR, https://www.savvyinvestor.net/alternativeasset-classes/hedge-funds/articles-and-white-papers [https://perma.cc/2FDP-PAAL] (featuring a
collection of white papers).
98. See, e.g., M&A TEAM, J.P. MORGAN, THE 2017 PROXY SEASON: GLOBALIZATION AND A
NEW NORMAL FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10–12 (2017) (documenting the growth of activist
campaigns focused on cost-cutting and strategic direction, as opposed to M&A objectives).
99. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 36 (reporting that 45.5% of U.S. activist campaigns ended
in a “truce” between 2010 and 2015); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Dancing with the Activists 4
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 604, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948869 [https://perma.cc/MZX8-SG32] (documenting evidence of a
sevenfold increase in settlement agreements between 2000 and 2013); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Agency Cost of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality 9
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 373, 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058319
[https://perma.cc/Z4PY-52AZ]
(reporting data from Lazard that 95% of the record 131 board seats obtained by activist hedge funds
in 2016 were the result of a settlement agreement).
100. LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM - 1Q 2018, at 5 (2018), https://
www.lazard.com/media/450557/lazard-1q-2018-activism-review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW9CDLDA].
101. LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/
450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6KT-54GS]
(reporting that 64% of board seats won by activists in 2017 occurred outside the proxy process).
102. LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM - 1H 2018, at 1 (2018), https://
www.lazard.com/media/450655/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-1h-2018.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/T9H5-URT2].
103. Id.
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These settlements between activists and issuers have a number of
features.104 They typically include a standstill agreement in which the activist
agrees not to engage in hostile activity as well as to adhere to additional
restrictions.105 They often contemplate a long-term engagement between
incumbent directors and activist nominees.106 Although board representation
may still simply be a means to exploring a sale or other structural changes,
many activist directors are retaining their board seats for multiple years107
and focusing their attention on business strategy and other operational
issues.108 In similar circumstances, settlement agreements are likely to
promote an environment in which activist-appointed directors—similar to
constituency directors in the VC context—work alongside incumbents as
colleagues to effect changes in a collaborative rather than confrontational
manner.109
Further, while constructivist activists have traditionally represented the
minority numerically (relative to hit-and-run, hostile activists), both the
empirical and anecdotal evidence point to substantial growth in this form of
activism.110 Commentators now suggest that collaborative engagement could
dominate hostile engagement in the future.111 In an article published in
104. See generally Francis J. Aquila, Negotiating a Settlement with an Activist Investor, PRAC.
L.J.: TRANSACTIONS & BUS., Apr. 2015, at 22, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Apr15
_InTheBoardroom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TJU-2PQQ] (describing common provisions in
settlement agreements with activist investors).
105. See, e.g., Derek D. Bork, Settlement Agreements with Activist Investors—the Latest
Entrenchment Device?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/07/settlement-agreements-with-activist-investors-thelatest-entrenchment-device/ [https://perma.cc/MW4G-4ZVZ] (describing common restrictions
imposed by settlement agreements on activists in connection with negotiated board representation).
106. For example, some companies require activist-appointed directors to “sign and pre-deliver
director resignations that are automatically triggered when the board decides that the representative
has breached the settlement agreement.” Id.
107. See, e.g., Ian D. Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin & Suraj Srinivasan, Activist Directors:
Determinants and Consequences 13 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-120, 2014),
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-120_451759fe-d298-4072-81d1b007fd4d5bc0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5P-FPZL] (reporting average tenure, as of 2013, of two years
for activist directors who had left the board and nearly four years for directors who are still on the
board).
108. See also Ethan A. Klingsberg & Elizabeth Bieber, Activism in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/29/
activism-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/G74V-5B5V] (observing that “[t]he activists are now regularly
holding investments for four to five years and focusing more consistently during the initial years of
their investments on advocating for operational turnarounds”).
109. Ira Millstein makes a convincing case for constructive activism in his recent book. See
generally IRA MILLSTEIN, THE ACTIVIST DIRECTOR (2017).
110. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of
Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 310–11 (2016) (providing empirical
evidence that the most successful activists have been capable of taking large stakes, gaining board
seats, and staying in a corporation for longer periods of time); Shill, supra note 8, at 1254, 1262–63
(describing a “dynamic of boards and activists . . . edging unmistakably towards collaboration” and
providing anecdotal evidence supporting this conclusion).
111. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 77, at 230.
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February 2018, the Financial Times spoke of a new class of “sons of
activists,” which includes several former portfolio managers of more
established, hostile hedge funds.112 This new generation of activists is
“eschewing the public dispute and open confrontation” of the older guard and
is instead “eager to work with management behind the scenes and to hold
positions for longer.”113
ValueAct’s involvement with Microsoft offers a high-profile example
of constructivist activism.114 In 2013, ValueAct researched Microsoft for
months, concluding that the company suffered from a “perception
problem.”115 Most investors believed that the company’s profits came largely
from the sale of operating systems and personal computers.116 The declining
PC market thus suggested that Microsoft’s prospects were not good.117
ValueAct instead believed the company’s strength lay in other services, such
as the company’s Office suite of products and Outlook email system.118
After some behind-the-scenes contacts, the parties signed a standstill
agreement, under which ValueAct obtained a board seat in exchange for
desisting from a potential proxy fight¾de facto choosing a collaborative
scheme over a competitive one.119 Following the signing of the standstill
agreement, Microsoft implemented several of the suggestions made by
ValueAct (including the appointment of a new CEO).120 Meanwhile, the
share price of Microsoft rose considerably.121
Commenting on the success of the venture, ValueAct’s Morfit Mason
remarked that Microsoft is not the usual hedge fund story of:
battles, victors, and losers . . . . It’s actually about re-examining all of
the premises on which a 40-year-old icon was built and discarding the
ones that don’t make sense in this world and driving toward the ones
that do. You can trace all of the actions that have happened at
Microsoft to that fundamental attitude. Not necessarily to us, but
Microsoft re-examining all of its fundamental beliefs.122
ValueAct’s investment in Microsoft was a long-term one. Mason sat on
the Microsoft board, and ValueAct held a substantial quantity of Microsoft

112. Lindsay Fortado, Investing: Activism Enters the Mainstream, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/e04547b8-0d0b-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2 [https://perma.cc/A2TCUQYP].
113. Id.
114. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 145–55.
115. Id. at 146.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 150–51.
120. Id. at 153–54.
121. Id. at 155.
122. Id. (quoting Mason).
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stock through 2017.123 During this time, Microsoft’s stock price continued to
increase.
The 94-page white paper released by Nelson Peltz’s Trian Fund—
another fund with a well-established reputation for constructivist activism—
in the recent engagement at Procter & Gamble (P&G)124 provides another
salient example. Trian’s white paper made it clear that the fund was seeking
to add Peltz to the P&G board in order to create “sustainable long-term value
at P&G”125 and not seeking to replace P&G’s CEO or any other “classic”
disciplinary outcomes sought by hostile activists.126 At least on paper, Trian
was seeking a collaborative rather than a competitive interaction with the
P&G board, one designed to add knowledge rather than to have the board
fired.127 Concededly, the P&G board strongly opposed Trian’s intervention,
which led to one of the most expensive proxy contests in history.128 In the
end, however, P&G shareholders narrowly supported Peltz’s candidacy.129 It
is also noteworthy that even after P&G conceded defeat, Peltz continued to
profess his intention not to disrupt the board’s operations but to “work[]
collaboratively with [P&G’s CEO] and the rest of the board to drive
sustainable long-term shareholder value.”130
Trian’s recent intervention in another classic American brand, General
Electric Company (GE), presents even clearer collaborative features. This
time, the company itself initiated the collaboration; GE’s CEO invited Trian
to invest in the company and become active in reforming it.131 That Trian had

123. See ValueAct Capital Reduces Microsoft Stake, MARKET FOLLY (Aug. 9, 2017),
http://www.marketfolly.com/2017/08/valueact-capital-reduces-microsoft-stake.html
[https://
perma.cc/U7NS-25BA] (reporting ValueAct’s sale of seven million Microsoft shares in 2017).
124. TRIAN PARTNERS, REVITALIZE P&G TOGETHER, VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD (2017),
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Trian-PG-White-Paper-9_6_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN6S-C6T6].
125. Id. at 4.
126. Martin Lipton, The Trian/P&G Proxy Contest, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/11/the-trianpg-proxycontest/ [https://perma.cc/F9EB-HRXL].
127. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, Three Reasons Why P&G Should Put Nelson Peltz on Its Board,
FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/04/pg-trian-proxy-battle/ [https://perma.cc/
4386-SENA] (arguing that shareholders should support Peltz because of weaknesses in P&G’s
operational strategy that might be remedied by “a consumer goods veteran who’s betting billions
that new thinking can revive a flagging American icon”).
128. Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter & Gamble Declares Victory in Expensive Proxy
Fight, CNN MONEY (Oct. 10, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/10/news/companies/proctergamble-proxy-fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/M7W2-RD47] (describing the contest as “the
most expensive in U.S. corporate history”).
129. See Nick Turner & Beth Jinks, P&G Names Activist Nelson Peltz to Board After Proxy
Battle (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/p-g-namesbillionaire-nelson-peltz-to-board-after-proxy-battle [https://perma.cc/4SPR-WD9P] (reporting that
Peltz won by fewer than 43,000 shares).
130. Id.
131. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Why Nelson Peltz Wants P&G to See Him as a ‘Constructivist,’ N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/business/dealbook/
nelson-peltzs-play-for-pampg-honorable-intentions.html [https://perma.cc/ACZ7-YE7Z].
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knowledge unavailable to GE was implicit in that request. At the same time,
as noted by one commentator, the request would arguably not have
materialized if Trian had not developed a reputation “for working behind the
scenes with management to improve performance . . . [and sticking] around,
often for years, as transformations occur.”132
On the front of the new generation of the “sons of activists,” up-andcoming D.E. Shaw & Co. made news in early 2018 for gaining three board
seats at Lowe’s, the giant home-improvement chain.133 The appointment of
D.E. Shaw’s activist directors took place after a settlement that Lowe’s
management described as involving “constructive discussions” with the
fund.134 Significantly, the entire campaign was kept private until the
settlement.135 According to industry watchers, this circumstance underlines
the change in the approach of the new generation of activists, which are “not
just less confrontational in public, but also easier to work with behind the
scenes.”136 Whereas the older guard would pressure or even intimidate
incumbents into effecting desired changes, the new guard is not “going to try
to intimidate anyone.”137 Instead, they are trying to collaborate with insiders.
Lastly, activist hedge fund Elliott Management, a fund commonly
associated with confrontation, recently disclosed that it has been engaged for
months in talks with the management of SAP SE, in which Elliott has a $1.4
billion stake.138 According to SAP management, the two are working on “new
initiatives to accelerate operational excellence and value creation.”139
2. Mutual and Pension Fund Engagement.—A substantial proportion of
large institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds are
committed investors in the sense that they do not or cannot readily sell their
stock if they disagree with managers’ operational decisions.140 This
commitment creates both an incentive for them to invest in generating firmspecific information and an assurance to managers that the concerns that the
investors bring to the dialogue are not the product of short-term strategies.141

132. Geoffrey Smith, GE Just Caved and Put One of Nelson Peltz’s Colleagues on Its Board,
FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/10/ge-just-caved-and-put-one-of-nelsonpeltzs-colleagues-on-its-board/ [https://perma.cc/6JQV-D4EB].
133. Fortado, supra note 112.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Eyk Henning, SAP and Elliott Have Held Strategy Talks for Months, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 24, 2019, 5:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/sap-elliott-aresaid-to-have-held-strategy-talks-for-months [https://perma.cc/KJD7-FCFU].
139. Id.
140. See Fisch et al., supra note 81, at 56–57 (explaining that so-called passive investors cannot
exit by selling their stock).
141. See id. at 52 (observing that passive investors do not benefit from strategies that generate
short-term gains at the expense of long-term value).

FISCH.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

Shareholder Collaboration

5/1/20 6:36 PM

887

Collaboration between large institutional investors and corporate
insiders, however, differs from hedge fund collaboration in both form and
substance. Institutional investors do not typically seek board
representation.142 Nor do they engage in the level of detailed research and
firm-specific analysis that characterizes hedge fund campaigns.143 Instead,
large institutions collaborate through various forms of “engagement,”144
which operationalizes a dialogical process145 about matters of concern.146 In
particular, engagement tends to focus on market-wide or industry-wide issues
such as governance, sustainability, and risk management,147 as the size of
institutional investors places them in a unique position to enjoy economies of
scale and observe trends across the companies in their portfolio that may
supplement the perspective of firm insiders.
Engagement by institutional investors often results in changes at the
involved companies, although these changes are the product of a consensus
process between corporate insiders and institutional investors. For example,
in a recent survey on the top successful engagement outcomes, shareholders
listed the promotion of additional company disclosures, the adoption of
specific changes in company policies or business practices, and the
company’s commitment to act on issues of concerns in the future.148
142. At least one corporation, UnitedHealth Group, has established an advisory committee to
allow shareholders to suggest new directors. Dangerous Talk? When/How Should Directors
Communicate with Shareholders?, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Latham & Watkins LLP, San Diego,
Cal.), at 2, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/52351925/1-dangerous-talk-when-howshould-directors-communicate-with- [https://perma.cc/QA44-PSW6]. John Coffee has proposed
that a steering committee of institutional investors in charge of assembling a team of outside
directors in case of an activist attack could provide an effective solution to the problems raised by
hedge-fund-appointed directors. Coffee, supra note 99, at 26.
143. See, e.g., SHARON E. FAY, ALL. BERNSTEIN, THE MEGAPHONE EFFECT 3 (2018)
https://www.alliancebernstein.com/sites/library/Instrumentation/FINAL_EQU-7697-0618.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2UQU-H5PL] (noting that “index funds are noticeably absent from engagement
based on fundamental research”).
144. For a detailed description of shareholder engagement, see Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin
Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 385, 392–94 (2016).
145. The SEC has expressly indicated its support for increased communication between issuers
and shareholders and offered “guidance on ways to enhance the ability of corporations to effectively
and efficiently communicate with shareholders.” Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder
Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 831 (2013).
146. See F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder
Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 24, 2015),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significantshareholder-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/M3BV-J4B6] (Vanguard CEO’s detailed description of
the practicalities of engagement).
147. PWC, DIRECTOR-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 2 (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/
governance-insights-center/publications/assets/pwc-director-shareholder-engagement-getting-itright.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4T2-CGFQ].
148. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND PROXY ACCESS 15 (2016),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/events/2016/11/2016-ndi-executive-exchange
[https://perma.cc/N2Q4-5T2P] (follow “Shareholder Engagement and Proxy Access” dropdown
menu; then follow “Program Materials”). Do we really need these “indications”?
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Engagement can take a wide range of forms, from private “one-on-one”
meetings149 to periodic investor days,150 investor relations contacts,151
industry conference presentations,152 a variety of online communication
tools,153 as well as letters and phone calls.154 Several companies have also
adopted “shareholder engagement policies,” which are designed to provide
structured interaction guidelines for engagement—including on the
frequency, methods, and topics of insider–shareholder interaction.155 Along
similar lines, some boards have established “engagement committees,”
which are permanently charged with managing the shareholder-engagement
process.156
Attesting to the mounting importance of shareholder engagement, a
recent survey found that 63% of large institutional investors have engaged in
direct discussions with management over the past five years, and 45% had
private discussions with a company’s board outside of management
presence.157 And while just 6% of S&P 500 companies reported investor

149. Deloitte, Shareholder Engagement: A New Era in Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J.:
RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2013/10/01/shareholder-engagement-a-new-era-in-corporate-governance/
[https://perma.cc/MTT8-679A].
150. Fairfax, supra note 146, at 831.
151. Matteo Tonello, Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 25, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/25/
global-trends-in-board-shareholder-engagement/#more-53945 [https://perma.cc/X97R-HREK].
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also What’s New in Shareholder Engagement: Telling Your Own Story, NASDAQ
(June 22, 2017), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/Material_Search.aspx?cid=130&mcd=CH
[https://perma.cc/PTC7-SF2K] (describing shareholder engagement through online interactive
proxy statements).
154. Fisch et al., supra note 81, at 48 (reporting that “[i]n recent years . . . . [m]utual funds have
increasingly made direct contact—by letter, phone, electronic communication, and direct
meetings—with the officers and directors of their portfolio companies”).
155. See, e.g., CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, CONSIDERING A SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
POLICY––THE WHAT, WHY AND HOW 2–4 (2016), https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/
689_Chapman_Considering_Shareholder_Engagement_Policy_092916.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
P7DL-PMH2] (identifying “best practices” for implementation of a shareholder engagement
policy).
156. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 148, at 9; see also Press Release, Tempur Sealy,
Tempur Sealy Announces Leadership and Board Changes (May 11, 2015), http://investor
.tempursealy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/tempur-sealy-announces-leadership-andboard-changes [https://perma.cc/YLE3-CCM8] (announcing the creation of “a new Stockholder
Liaison Committee, in order to create a Board-level structure for communication and engagement
between the Board and stockholders and to enhance the existing stockholder communications
process led by the Company’s management”); Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman &
CEO, Vanguard, to Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard Fund’s Largest
Portfolio
Holdings
(Feb.
27,
2015),
https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/7-CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf [https://perma.cc/93SV-8RDZ] (explaining that
“‘shareholder liaison committee[s]’ . . . can provide an appropriate structure for communicating
with significant shareholders”).
157. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2906 (2016).
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engagement in 2010, engagement figures rose to 72% as of June 2017.158 The
numbers for BlackRock and Vanguard are especially telling. From mid-2014
to mid-2015, BlackRock performed over 1,500 private “engagements” with
companies held in their portfolio, and Vanguard had over 800 company
engagements.159
Besides engagement, examples of collaborative initiatives by
institutional investors continue to emerge. On August 31, 2017, for instance,
Vanguard released a letter to investors pushing for a two-way dialogue with
corporations and reaffirming the importance of building “relationships with
boards and management teams.”160 Only eight days later, on September 8,
2017, Scott Stringer, the New York City Comptroller who manages the New
York City Pension Funds, released a similar letter to the boards of 151
companies requesting a meeting with these companies’ directors to discuss
matters such as director criteria, diversity, and skillsets, and their linkage to
the companies’ needs and risks.161 Similarly, in June 2018, T. Rowe Price
issued a statement emphasizing that the firm’s “ability to generate unique
insights about companies” reflected the additional “ability to cultivate
constructive, private, two-way communication” with company management
teams.162
Further, engagement does not just occur at the individual company level.
Both investors and issuers are participating in a growing number of private
initiatives aimed at promoting insider–shareholder collaboration on a variety
of issues and, in particular, corporate governance matters.163 One of the first
such initiatives was the “Shareholder-Director Exchange Program” (SDX), a
158. Mark Manoff & Stephen W. Klemash, 2017 Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/09/
2017-proxy-season-review/ [https://perma.cc/9TV4-5E74]. Among others, a company’s
responsiveness to shareholder requests for engagement has also become one of the fundamental
evaluation criteria used by the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) in recommending votes on a
variety of governance topics, which might be one of the factors behind the increase in shareholder
engagement. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 148, at 5.
159. Fichtner et al., supra note 80, at 318.
160. Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman & CEO, Vanguard, to Directors of Public
Companies Worldwide (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/
governance-letter-to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9EE-33XP].
161. Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer, NYC Pension Funds Launch
National Boardroom Accountability Project Campaign—Version 2.0 (Sept. 8, 2017), https://
comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/press-releases/comptroller-stringer-nyc-pension-funds-launchnational-boardroom-accountability-project-campaign-version-2-0/
[https://perma.cc/VC3LZDSV].
162. T. ROWE PRICE, T. ROWE PRICE’S INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY ON SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM 1 (2018), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/trowepriceesgspotlightjune2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VKN5-4BCS].
163. Shareholders are also participating in coordinated engagements. See, e.g., Elroy Dimson,
Oguzhan Karakas & Xi Li, Coordinated Engagements 2 (Dec. 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209072
[https://perma.cc/WXB8-HRS8]
(describing coordinated engagements by investors seeking to influence issuers on environmental
and social issues).
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private organization established in 2014 by representatives of major U.S.
corporations and big institutional investors like BlackRock and Vanguard.164
The SDX’s aim is promoting a voluntary template for healthy relations
between shareholders and boards as well as regular and successful
engagement on matters such as corporate governance, management changes,
and long-term plans.165 Importantly, in defining successful engagement, the
SDX’s protocol includes as essential “each party’s willingness to listen
carefully to one another and to take action in response to valid concerns.”166
That is, each party’s willingness to collaborate with the other is crucial within
the SDX framework.167
Along similar lines, in 2016, representatives of major U.S. corporations
and major investors (including Blackrock, Vanguard, and ValueAct) signed
a paper calling for new commonsense principles of corporate governance,
principles that build on a constructive dialogue among the involved parties.168
In 2017, a collective of U.S.-based institutional investors and global asset
managers169 launched the “Investor Stewardship Group” (ISG), with the aim
of improving cooperation among companies, large investors, and
shareholders.170 The same year the International Business Council of the

164. Linette Lopez, A New Group Has Declared War on the Carl Icahns of the World, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2014, 9:13 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/shareholder-directorexchange-2014-2 [https://perma.cc/9RX7-RVBF]; see also SDX, THE SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR
EXCHANGE: INTRODUCTION AND PROTOCOL 1 (2014), http://www.sdxprotocol.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/04/SDX_Introduction-and-Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TFV-BHAE] (explaining
the rationale for and setting forth a ten-point protocol offering issuers and shareholders guidance on
when to engage and how to make those engagements valuable).
165. David Gelles, Unlikely Allies Seek to Check Power of Activist Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2014, 10:01 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/unlikely-alliesseek-to-check-power-of-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/KF9P-BNCG]. In the words of one
SDX member, the SDX developed in the belief that “[s]hareholders and the boards that serve them
need to be closer, they need to be more integrated, and there need to be real relationships.” Id.
(quoting James C. Woolery, the chairman-elect of Cadwalader).
166. Id. (quoting SDX protocol).
167. Consistent with the increasingly proactive approach to engagement taken by both investors
and corporations, the SDX meetings—as observed by a founding member—“have to have a
purpose . . . . It isn’t just about everyone getting to know one another.” Id. (quoting Michelle Edkins
of BlackRock).
168. Open Letter: Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, COMMONSENSE CORP.
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, https://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
2016-Open-Letter-Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM2X-W6X6]. Among other governance
matters, the commonsense principles cover the composition, election, compensation, and tenure of
directors; the communication process between the board and the investors; shareholder rights;
public reporting and management compensation; and succession planning. Id.
169. Anne Meyer, Don Cassidy & Rajeev Kumar, The Investor Stewardship Group’s
Governance Principles, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 11, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/11/the-investor-stewardship-groups-governanceprinciples/ [https://perma.cc/F69Y-QVE2].
170. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Common-Sense Capitalism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/28/
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World Economic Forum approved “The New Paradigm,” a programmatic
framework that “conceives of corporate governance as a collaboration among
corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders,”171 with the expectation
that institutional investors will “work to understand corporations’ strategies
and operations and engage with them to provide corporations with
opportunities to understand the investors’ opinions and to adjust strategies
and operations in order to receive the investors’ support.”172
Investors’ common ownership—the fact that many institutional
investors own “significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry”173
—also enhances their incentives to collaborate with corporate insiders.
Common ownership gives investors a comparative advantage relative to firm
management in acquiring information that may be of value to several of their
portfolio companies—such as information about macroeconomic trends,
evolving legal risks, and developing market norms. Investors are increasingly
choosing to use this advantage with, rather than against, management. An
example is the recent efforts by several large institutional investors to work
with their portfolio companies to promote increased attention to
sustainability issues. Thus, last year, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street
led efforts to induce Exxon management to devote greater attention to—as
well as adopt greater disclosure and transparency about—the risks associated
with climate change.174

common-sense-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/X2GK-GGJ3]; see also John C. Wilcox, The Investor
Stewardship Group: An Inflection Point in U.S. Corporate Governance?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/30/
the-investor-stewardship-group-an-inflection-point-in-u-s-corporate-governance/
[https://perma.cc/4UUW-3RUQ] (noticing the overlap between the ISG member firms and
signatories to the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance). The ISG plans to achieve
this goal by providing a “set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed
companies . . . as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors.” Meyer et
al., supra 169. From this Article’s perspective, what is noteworthy about the ISG principles is that
they endorse a “comply-or-explain” approach, which is intended to provide companies with the
necessary flexibility to adopt tailored, collaborative solutions. Id.
171. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporategovernance-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/3R9U-74BE]; see also WORLD ECON. FORUM,
ANNUAL REPORT 2016 - 2017, at 44 (2017), http://www3.wefrum.org/docs/WEF
_Annual_Report_2016_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2WU-KG3X].
172. Lipton, supra note 171.
173. Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance,
105 IOWA L. REV. 507, 509 (2020).
174. See Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholderrebellion-over-climate-change/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9160808b20a6
[https://perma.cc/98A3-C34B] (citing an unnamed source as indicating that BlackRock, likely along
with Vanguard and State Street, voted to support a shareholder proposal requesting management
reporting about climate change).
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Large institutional investors also have privileged access to legal and
regulatory policy. As Asaf Eckstein documents, institutional investors are
increasingly invited to comment on regulatory initiatives at a preproposal
stage and to engage in a dialogue with policymakers.175 This access both
enables investors to influence regulatory policies in ways that may benefit
their portfolio companies and provides them early insights into potential
regulatory changes that may require firms to adapt their operational policies.
Finally, institutional investors serve a critical gatekeeping role with
respect to hedge fund activism. It is well known that, because of their
relatively small stakes, activists need the support of passive investors to be
successful, support that in the past they have frequently been able to secure.176
In recent years, however, institutional investors have taken a more nuanced
view of activist interventions.177 On the one hand, they have increasingly
withheld support of activists who primarily seek to force companies into
share buybacks, extraordinary distributions, and other short-term “cut and
run” strategies,178 which are incompatible with the longer investment horizon
of institutional investors. On the other hand, institutional investors have
remained willing to support activists that are committed to long-term value
through collaboration.179 Further, institutional investors’ ability to function
as the marginal voters in activist campaigns strengthens their effectiveness in
ongoing engagement. Managers increasingly recognize that the support of
institutional investors is a valuable defense to potentially hostile
interventions and, as a result, have become more willing to engage with
investors, build relationships, and respond to their concerns.180
175. Eckstein, supra note 172, at 47–48.
176. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 866–67 (explaining that activists need the support
of traditionally passive investors).
177. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377,
1440–41 (2017) (reporting that institutional investors have recently begun, in some cases, to support
companies against activist interventions).
178. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s to Stop
Being so Nice to Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos-to-stop-being-sonice-to-investors.html [https://perma.cc/L5H2-34NP] (discussing the concerns expressed by Larry
Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, about short-termist hedge fund activism).
179. As Larry Fink explained in BlackRock’s 2016 letter to CEOs, “activists who focus on
long-term value creation sometimes do offer better strategies than management. In those cases,
BlackRock’s corporate governance team will support activist plans.” Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter
the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS.
INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letterto-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/ZYX2-RDAX].
180. See, e.g., Peter Michelsen & Derek Zaba, The Rise of Investor-Centric Activism Defense
Strategy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/25/the-rise-of-investor-centric-activism-defense-strategy/
[https://perma.cc/Q6JV-UWYX] (“[T]he right approach for companies is to ‘think like a
shareholder representative’: engage with investors, understand and incorporate their perspectives,
and educate them on why the company is pursuing a particular strategy, particularly before an
activist appears.”).
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III. Defending and Structuring the Collaborative Model
Part II explained that the insider–shareholder dynamic in the public
corporation is increasingly collaborative, rather than competitive, as argued
by the defendants of the traditional models of the corporation. It also
suggested that collaboration is a response to the informational changes that
have occurred in corporate production and the role of shareholders, changes
under which partial information problems have, for many firms, grown
costlier than agency problems.
In this Part, we use insights from both epistemic models of collective
wisdom and the economics of information to defend the normative
desirability of the collaborative model. We do this through the following
steps. In subpart A, we explain that the partial information of investors and
insiders is likely to be complementary, so that the informational whole
resulting from the aggregation of insider and shareholder information is
greater than the sum of its parts. In subpart B, we show that collaboration
provides a mechanism for efficiently combining the partial and
complementary information of insiders and shareholders, a mechanism that
neither unilateral decision-making nor the mediated transmission of
information through markets can provide. In subpart C, we offer an
illustration to make the value-increasing properties of shareholder
collaboration more tangible. Lastly, in subpart D, we discuss how the rules
of the collaborative “game” should be designed to ensure that collaboration
is compatible with the individual incentives of directors, managers, and
shareholders.
A.

The Value of Collaboration

1. Information Complementarity.—As we discussed above, the value of
collaboration flows from the aggregation of the partial information that
insiders and shareholders possess in a world of complex investments and
reconcentrated equity ownership. We argue that the source of this added
value stems from the fact that the partial information supplied by
shareholders and insiders is likely to be “complementary” in nature.
Information is complementary when the possession of one piece of
information increases the marginal value of acquiring the second piece so
that the informational whole is greater than the sum of its parts.181
Complementary information is to be distinguished from substitute
information. Information is substitute if the possession of one piece of
information decreases the marginal value of acquiring another piece of
information.182 In essence, information that is relatively similar tends to be
181. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1422, 1467 (2011).
182. Id.
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substitute, as the second piece of information does not contribute much to the
preexisting knowledge.
Cognitive models help explain why corporate insiders and shareholders
are likely to possess complementary rather than substitute information. These
models distinguish between interpretative signals and the standard generated
signals of statistical collective-wisdom models.183 “Generated” signals are
the result of a random variable drawn from a distribution.184 For example, in
the corporate context, observed sales of a new product send a generated signal
about whether the product is of good quality. Generated signals, however, do
not capture the fact that agents both receive signals and also interpret them,
determining their meaning in light of other information, experience, and
expertise. Thus, an agent might use its knowledge of the market, consumer
needs, or past sales to determine whether the signal it receives from the sales
of a new product is about customers’ reactions to the product’s quality or its
price. Interpreting this signal correctly allows managers to make appropriate
operational decisions about the future of the product. The role of
interpretation may also induce firm decision-makers to search for a different
kind of information than that provided by the sales of the product alone.
Cognitive models of collective wisdom seek to capture this richer
signaling structure through the concept of “interpreted” signals. Unlike
generated signals, which are passively received by the agents, interpreted
signals result from the agents’ “active cognitive effort.”185 That is, to create
an interpreted signal, an agent uses an interpretative model that filters reality
into a set of categories and then uses these categories to make predictions
about the variable of interest.186 Under this richer cognitive structure, what
matters for the ability of a collection of agents to produce more accurate
predictions than a single agent in isolation are the characteristics of the
agents’ interpretative models.

183. Lu Hong & Scott Page, Interpreted and Generated Signals, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 2174,
2175 (2009).
184. More technically, Hong and Page explain generated signals as follows:
For example, suppose the relevant issue concerns the status of a firm which can be
classified as either “good” (G) or “bad” (B). Agents do not know the true status, but
they have a common prior, say, P(G) = P(B) = ½. Each agent draws a binary signal,
whose value is either g or b, from given distributions. Most often, these signals would
be assumed to be drawn independently, i.e. their values would be independent
conditional on the true status of the firm.
Id.
185. Id.
186. More formally, cognitive models begin by defining predictive problems as involving a set
of possible states of the world X and an outcome function F, which maps each possible state of the
world into a given outcome. Each individual’s interpretation of the possible states of the world is
then a partition of the set of states into distinct categories. Note that predictive models are coarser
than the outcome function. Indeed, whereas the objective function maps states of the world into
outcomes, predictive models map sets of states of the world, namely categories, into outcomes. See
id. at 2176 (discussing the process of creating an interpretive signal in an interpretive model).
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Cognitive theory shows that these models need to be sophisticated and
diverse.187 The intuition can be grasped as follows. First, when agents use
sophisticated interpretative models, they will tend to partition the set of
possible states of the world into many categories (that is, more than when
they use less sophisticated interpretative models). Second, when agents use
diverse interpretative models, each individual will create a different partition
of the possible states of the world.188 As a result, signal heterogeneity (the
production of different predictions) stems from cognitive diversity among
sophisticated agents rather than randomness (as for generated signals).189 It
follows that information based on interpreted signals is more likely to be
complementary, relative to information that is the result of generated signals.
The interpretive models of shareholders and insiders are particularly
likely to be sophisticated and diverse and, hence, complementary. To begin
with, board members are selected for their “institutional competence,” which
denotes both expertise and the ability to acquire and process information.
Similarly, institutional shareholders, such as large mutual funds and hedge
funds, are increasingly sophisticated, as they demonstrate a growing
commitment to understanding the operations of their portfolio companies.
Because of insiders’ access to private firm-specific information, their
interpretative models can also realistically be assumed to be diverse from
those used by shareholders. But diversity also is a defining feature of the
investor crowd. Institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds have
different business models and investment horizons than hedge funds.190
Further, hedge funds themselves tend to have different business models and
exhibit idiosyncratic features, especially when it comes to target selection.191
Some hedge funds, for example, focus on targeting companies in certain
industries; others are governance specialists.192 Each fund follows a different
template in deciding when moving on a company.193 Indeed, investor
diversity is quintessential to their ability to compete with each other. If
investors shared the same business model, they would no longer have the
prospect of delivering competitively superior performance.
The diversity of insider and investor perspectives, experiences, and
objectives increases the likelihood that they bring not just different but also
complementary information to firm decision-making. As a result, if a

187. Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Some Microfoundations of Collective Wisdom, in COLLECTIVE
WISDOM 56, 57 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012).
188. More analytically, diverse interpretative models tend to produce negatively correlated
predictions and negatively correlated predictions produce better aggregate outcomes. Id. at 57–58.
189. Hong & Page, supra note 183, at 2175.
190. See supra section II(C)(2).
191. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 11–21 (comparing the business models and intervention
strategies of the most important U.S. hedge funds).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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collaborative model provides a mechanism for aggregating that information,
it can enable the firm to make better-informed decisions, thereby increasing
firm value.
2. Aggregating Shareholder Information: Collaboration Versus
Markets.—As used in this Article, collaboration contemplates a direct
deliberative process between boards and shareholders, similar to what
typically happens in legislative bodies.194 Deliberation allows agents to
convey their interpreted signals directly, to receive feedback from other
participants, and to modify their signals in response to that feedback. The
obvious alternative to collaboration is the aggregation of shareholder
information through the capital markets.
It is widely recognized that the public capital markets collect and
incorporate a wide variety of firm-specific and industry information,
information that is incorporated through pricing.195 Notably, Frederick Hayek
was the first to emphasize how the dispersed individual knowledge
aggregated through market contracting accurately determines prices, even if
the average individual market participant cannot.196 Under Hayek’s epistemic
version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand,197 the price system provides a form
of mediated interaction between insiders and shareholders, which can be
relied on to aggregate their respective information.198 Moving from this
assumption, Jeffrey Gordon’s analysis of the independent board relies on the
capital markets to convey shareholder information to independent
directors.199 Under this model, shareholder information, including
shareholders’ analysis of corporation decisions, is reflected by stock prices.
Independent directors then use the information provided by prices for optimal

194. See John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public
Deliberation, 16 POL. COMM. 3, 5 (1999) (discussing the effects of direct deliberation in influencing
judgment).
195. The seminal treatment of the incorporation of information into market prices can be found
in Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565–89 (1984) (exploring the mechanisms by which information is
incorporated into prices).
196. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945).
197. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1,
9–12 (2009) (examining how Hayek’s “division of knowledge” idea, which emphasizes “the
dispersed and tacit character of knowledge in markets,” originated as an “aggregative invisible-hand
mechanism[]”).
198. One could argue that because this view relies on trading as a transmission mechanism,
markets could aggregate shareholder information effectively but never fully aggregate insider
information in a context in which insiders are prohibited by law from trading on their private
information. This limitation, however, is overcome when one considers that insiders’ disclosure
obligations may also serve as a transmission mechanism, as both disclosure and trading serve to
convey the agent’s information.
199. Gordon, supra note 27, at 1470.

FISCH.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

Shareholder Collaboration

5/1/20 6:36 PM

897

decision-making, evaluating that information against their own private
information about corporate affairs.
To the extent that prices provide a sufficient mechanism to aggregate
relevant information, direct collaboration would thus seem to be unnecessary.
We reject this conclusion and argue that the rise of shareholder collaboration
responds to limitations in the ability of the capital markets to aggregate partial
and complementary information. There are two sources of these limitations.
First, there may be limitations to market efficiency.200 Although over time,
prices may converge to fundamental values, time delays and noise may result
in persistent gaps between prices and fundamental values.201 These gaps
reduce the effectiveness of prices in informing business decisions. It follows
that while prices can be useful for the ex post monitoring of corporate
decisions, they are less useful for aggregating information on production
decision-making.202
Second, asset-pricing theory teaches that information is aggregated only
when traders have substitute information.203 Here, substitute information is
sufficiently similar information that a trader does not need other traders’
information to make predictions about the value of a project or company. For
example, one trader might have information on a company’s sales, while
another may have knowledge of a company’s distribution agreements. Both
sets of information provide a proxy on the company’s future productivity, but
neither prediction is substantially improved by access to the other trader’s
information.204 As a result, each trader will trade based on her own
information, which will then be incorporated in the company’s stock price as
predicted by the Hayekian model.
When traders have complementary information, the information of other
traders enables each to make a more accurate prediction about the value of a
project or company. Unlike substitute information, however, complementary
information in competitive markets with partially informed traders may not
get aggregated at all.205 Consider, for example, the case of a computer
manufacturer that is ready to launch a new computer. One investor
200. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 272 (2014) (observing
that “market efficiency is a matter of degree”).
201. For a more technical analysis of the sources of market inefficiency, see William W. Bratton
& Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control, CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 25–34).
202. Id. at 34.
203. Asset-pricing theory in this case talks of “non-separable” securities. See Michael
Ostrovsky, Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders, 80
ECONOMETRICA 2595, 2596 (2012) (“If the security is ‘non-separable,’ then there exists a prior and
an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated.”).
204. In the actuality, information is never totally substitute or complementary but rather
partially complementary and partially substitute. Therefore, the representation in the text above, as
well as in the example in subpart III(B), should be intended as providing a stylized illustration of
current informational structures.
205. Ostrovsky, supra note 203, at 2596.
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specializes in hardware products, while the other trader is an expert in
software. In this case, the two sets of information are complementary because
each investor could benefit from access to the other’s information to make a
better prediction about the compatibility of the new computer’s hardware
with the software available (or forthcoming) in the market. It follows that
both investors will trade on incomplete information about the project’s value,
which will be reflected in an inaccurate evaluation of the project and,
therefore, inaccurate pricing of the company’s stock.
Unlike market trading, a deliberative process allows the investors to
combine their complementary information about the new computer project to
evaluate the project and transmit relevant knowledge to each other or the
board or both. Accordingly, when different pieces of information are
complementary such that the possession of one piece of information increases
the value of acquiring another piece, only the direct communication of
information allows corporate actors to extract that added value, while the
mediated transmission of information through market trading cannot. Only
through a deliberative process can investors convey their full information set,
which may have multiple dimensions (meaning that one signal may be
associated with multiple states of the world). In contrast, when investors
communicate through trading, they can only observe market prices, which
are unidimensional objects.
3. The Value of Collaboration: An Illustration.—We offer, in this
section, a hypothetical example to illustrate in more detail the potential
superiority of collaboration over market trading for aggregating the
complementary information of corporate insiders and shareholders. For
simplicity, the example focuses on the relationship between the board and a
single investor, but the analysis can be extended to cases involving
information possessed by multiple participants, including managers,
independent boards, hedge funds, and institutional investors.
Consider a computer manufacturer, which we will call NewSys, that is
about to launch a new computer. Similar to the stylized illustration at the end
of section 2 above, we assume that the board of NewSys has private
information on the hardware produced by NewSys, while RedRock, an
investor, has private information on the software that is available on the
market,206 so that the two information sets are complementary.207
206. RedRock’s information may come from its engagement with other portfolio companies or
industry expertise that it has developed through research. The board may also have information on
available market software but not the same information as RedRock.
207. For simplicity, the example represents the investors’ partial information in terms of
asymmetric information, meaning that both the board and the investors have private information not
available to the other party. Conceptually, however, this need not be the case. For example, in the
Microsoft case discussed above, ValueAct did not hold private information not available to the
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Assume that the value of NewSys critically depends on the success of
the computer project, which turns on the compatibility of the new hardware
with the available and emerging software, the standards for which are being
developed in the industry. The uncertainty affecting the compatibility
between the hardware and the software is captured by four possible states of
the world, whose occurrence is equiprobable (i.e., each state materializes
with a probability of one-fourth). These states are A, B, C, and D and have
the following characteristics:
Under State A, the hardware produced by NewSys is of Type 1, while
a new operating system available from developers in the market is of
the kind Compatible 1. This means that the developers’ new software
matches NewSys’s hardware;
under State B, the new hardware is of Type 1, while the new software
is of the kind Compatible 2. This means that the available software
does not match the new hardware;
under State C, the new hardware is of Type 2, while the new software
is of the kind Compatible 1. This means that the available software
does not match the new hardware;
under State D, the new hardware is of Type 2, while the new software
is of the kind Compatible 2. This means that the available software
matches the new hardware.
NewSys’s computer project will be valuable if its hardware is
compatible with the new software, as captured by States A and D, but not in
States B and C. To capture this, assume that shares of NewSys stock have
value equal to $200 under States A and D and zero under States B and C.
Further assume that under the above informational structure, where the
board has private information on the hardware and RedRock has private
information on the available software, each receives a signal based on its
private information. The board’s received signal can be either 𝑎! or 𝑎" . If the
signal is 𝑎! , the board knows that the new computer is of Type 1; therefore,
the state of the world will be either A or B with the same probability. If the
signal is 𝑎" , the board knows that the new computer is of Type 2; therefore,
the state of the world will be either C or D with the same probability.
Similarly, RedRock receives a signal that can be either 𝑟! or 𝑟" . If the signal
is 𝑟! , RedRock knows that the software is of the kind Compatible 1; therefore,
the state of the world will be either A or C with the same probability. If the
signal is 𝑟" , RedRock knows that the software is of the kind Compatible 2;

Microsoft board but rather proposed a different interpretation of information shared by the board.
See supra text accompanying notes 114–23. This said, from a modeling perspective, a different
interpretation of the same information can be represented, in a first approximation, as novel
information and hence as a matter of asymmetric information. Therefore, the use of an asymmetric
information setting in our example imports no loss of generality.
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therefore, the state of the world will be either B or D with the same
probability.
Under this information structure, both the board and RedRock expect
the value of the computer project as reflected in the price of NewSys stock to
be $100.208 If the board receives the signal 𝑎! , the state of the world can be
either A or B with the same probability, making the expected value of
NewSys stock ½ × ($200) + ½ × (0) = $100. The same holds if the board
receives the signal 𝑎" (under which the state of the world can be either C or
D with the same probability). Likewise, if RedRock receives the signal 𝑟!
(under which the state of the world can be either A or C with the same
probability), the expected value of NewSys stock to RedRock is also $100.
The same holds if RedRock receives the signal 𝑟" (under which the state of
the world can be either B or D with the same probability).
Competitive trading in this case will not aggregate the complementary
information of the board and RedRock, as each party is unable to infer
anything from the other party’s valuation of the NewSys stock. Under the
price signal reflecting RedRock’s beliefs, the board will not be able to update
its beliefs about the compatibility of the computer project with the software
market. This simple illustration then shows that competitive trading does not
allow market participants to coordinate information to make valuemaximizing operational decisions. Indeed, in this scenario, the board will
underinvest relative to a scenario in which it knows about the project’s
compatibility with the software and hence that the true value of the project to
NewSys is $200. Correspondingly, the board will overinvest relative to a
scenario in which it can determine that the project is flawed due to an absence
of compatibility.
Consider now a scenario where the board and RedRock can directly
communicate with each other. For example, suppose the board receives the
signal 𝑎! (under which the true state of the world is either State A or B) and
RedRock receives the signal 𝑟" (under which the true state of the world is
either State B or D) and they exchange this information. Through this
deliberation, the board and RedRock will learn that the only state that is
consistent with their respective signals is State B. That is, they would both
know that computer is of Type 1, while the software is of the kind
Compatible 2, which implies that the computer project has no value. This
would enable the board to make a better operational decision by halting the
hardware investment. On the other hand, under reciprocal signals that are
208. Defining NewSys stock as S, this result is calculated as follows: S|𝑎! = S|𝑎" = S|𝑟! = S|𝑟"
= 100. More analytically, S|𝑏! = [Prob (A)|𝑎! ] × ($200) + [Prob (B)|𝑎! ] × (0) = $100, where, by
Bayes’s Rule, Prob (A)|𝑎! = [Prob (𝑎! |A) × Prob (A)]/[Prob (𝑎)] = (½ × ¼)/(½) = ½ as Prob (𝑎! )
= Prob (A) + Prob (B) = ½. In this example Prob (B)|𝑏! , Prob (C)|𝑏" , Prob (D)|𝑏" , Prob (A)|𝑟! ,
Prob (C)|𝑟! , Prob (B)|𝑟" , and Prob (D)|𝑟" are each equal to ½. Because S|𝑎" = S|𝑟! = S|𝑟" are also
computed following the same procedure, it is clear why both the board and RedRock expect NewSys
stock to be equal to $100.
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compatible with a matched technology (i.e., State A or D), the board would
know that it is desirable to expand the investment in the computer project.
Therefore, aggregating the board’s complementary information with that of
investor RedRock would enable NewSys to match its operational decisionmaking to the state of the outside world in a way that maximizes firm value
(and stock price).209
B.

The Governance of Collaboration
The preceding discussion has shown that collaboration is socially
efficient, as it can contribute value that neither unilateral decision-making
nor the mediated transmission of information through markets can provide.
We now turn to the governance of collaboration, drawing on insights from
the theory of cooperative games to identify what governance structures can
help ensure that both corporate insiders and investors have the right
individual incentives to collaborate.210
1. Economic Rights.—In the language of game theory, shareholder
collaboration can be understood as a “cooperative” game. A game is defined
as cooperative when players form “coalitions” to achieve their mutual
goals.211 Two preliminary conditions determine whether it is worthwhile for
209. For completeness, we also consider the case in which information is substitute rather than
complementary. In this case, assume that RedRock receives an unambiguous signal that the true
state is A, so that Prob (A)|𝑟! = 1 holds. Also assume that the board still receives the original signal
𝑎! , so that Prob (A)|𝑎 = ½. Since RedRock has perfect information on the true state, while the board
only has partial information, RedRock does not need to aggregate the board’s information to
improve its predictions. Under these different circumstances, upon the occurrence of State A and
after receiving its informative signal, RedRock will be willing to buy more NewSys stock, as it
knows that NewSys’s fundamental value is $200, and RedRock’s trading will drive up the share
price. RedRock will be willing to buy NewSys shares as long as the price is below $200. Upon
observing RedRock’s trading, the board will in turn realize that the only state that is compatible
with its private information (under which the true state can be either A or B) and with a trading price
above $100 is State A. This is consistent with the conclusion that when information is substitute,
market trading efficiently aggregates information. Note, however, that this aggregation does not
solve other asset-pricing imperfections such as timing issues. Indeed, sophisticated investors with
short-term business models may have distortionary incentives, including incentives not to reveal
their information immediately. These distortions increase when investors have market power. See
Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek, 79 REV.
ECON. STUD. 539, 540 (2012) (formally showing that in a dynamic market, rational investors can
find it profitable to speculate on short-term price differentials).
210. It is worth observing that one can describe most strategic interactions as employing either
cooperative or noncooperative game theory. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A
COURSE IN GAME THEORY 255–56 (1994) (explaining the differences between cooperative and
noncooperative approaches when used to represent individual strategic decisions in a coalition). In
the latter case, the model becomes one of bargaining with alternative offers. However, while one
could argue that the analytical result would be the same, we believe that cooperative game theory is
better suited to represent the novel collaborative dynamics between corporate insiders and outside
investors.
211. A cooperative solution involves a stable set of outcomes such that it meets two conditions:
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the players to form a coalition. First, the players must be able to do better
together than alone—this is the superadditivity condition.212 Second, larger
coalitions must be more valuable than smaller ones—this is the monotonicity
condition.213
Insider–shareholder collaboration satisfies both conditions. First, as
detailed in the preceding subparts, participatory deliberative mechanisms
allow the corporation to capture the added value of insider and shareholder
complementary inputs. Assuming that both insiders and shareholders receive
a portion of this added value, collaboration thus satisfies superadditivity.
Second, the value added by collaboration naturally increases with the number
of investors participating in the deliberative process so long as information is
complementary. As a result, larger coalitions will outperform smaller
coalitions and therefore satisfy monotonicity.214
The theory of cooperative games also teaches that a coalition must be
beneficial for each individual player. That is, a player’s incentive to
participate requires that a player’s expected gains from participation exceed
what the player would receive by playing individually outside the
coalition.215 As applied to shareholder collaboration, this implies that the
participation costs involved by collaboration must be reflected in the
expected payoff. For example, collaborating shareholders may incur
significant research costs216 that they will be unwilling to bear unless the
share of the gains from collaboration compensates them for such costs.
This constraint raises questions about the appropriate allocation of
economic rights—how the value produced by the coalition should be divided
among its members. In the corporate context, the existing allocation of
economic rights contains two components, which, we argue, are by their
nature compatible with insider–shareholder collaboration. The first is the
equity contract, which allocates gains from the corporation in a manner that
is proportionate to investors’ economic interests. The second is equity-based
compensation for corporate insiders—officers and directors.

“(1) for every outcome outside the [cooperative] set some coalition can achieve an outcome inside
the set that is better for all its members and (2) no coalition can achieve an outcome inside the set
better for all its members than another outcome inside the set.” PAUL WEIRICH, COLLECTIVE
RATIONALITY 152 (2010).
212. MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME THEORY 671 (Mike Borns ed., Ziv Hellman trans.,
2013).
213. Id. at 672.
214. Notably, the shift to reconcentrated equity ownership both enables the implementation of
participatory deliberative mechanisms and limits the number of investors who possess the incentives
and resources to collaborate with insiders.
215. WEIRICH, supra note 211, at 156.
216. Under the assumption that proxy-fight costs are, at least in part, indicative of an investor’s
research costs, it is worth observing that a campaign ending in a proxy fight has an average cost for
the investor of around $10.71 million. Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism:
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 611 (2013).
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The pro-rata rule embedded in the equity contract is the distinctive
feature that makes this contract compatible with shareholder collaboration,
thus supporting the view that collaboration is consistent with the existing
structure of corporate law. Indeed, the pro-rata rule facilitates efficient
collaboration in several ways. First, by ensuring that shareholders participate
in the value added proportionately to the size of their equity stake, pro-rata
sharing makes it rational for shareholders to engage in the production of
complementary information and make a substantial investment prior to
collaborating.217
Second, by ensuring that investors internalize both the benefits and the
costs of engagement, the pro-rata rule anchoring investors’ payoff from
collaboration to the size of their equity stakes increases the likelihood that
collaborative efforts will be designed to enhance firm value.
Third, the equity contract also reduces (but does not eliminate, as we
note below) the concern that collaboration might be a vehicle through which
players collude to obtain private benefits. Such concern, for example,
undermines the viability of collaboration in the administrative context, where
critics worry that collaborative processes might be exploited by powerful
industry players and public interest groups to the detriment of the general
public interest.218 In the corporate context, this risk is reduced because the
equity contract provides a premium to all shareholders from efficient
collaboration (proportionally to their equity stake), leveling the bargaining
power of all interested parties in the distribution of the gains arising from
deliberation.
Equity-based compensation contracts, which tie executive
compensation to equity returns, further ensure the compatibility of
collaboration with the existing structure of corporate law by giving
executives their own incentives to participate in value-increasing
collaboration. Indeed, executive-compensation structures have evolved over
the past thirty years to feature both an increasing proportion of equity-based
compensation219 and compensation structures that involve longer time
horizons for the realization of increases in stock price.220 Outside directors
also receive a substantial proportion of their compensation in the form of

217. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund activists, for example, typically acquire
substantial stakes in target companies before publicly announcing their presence, allowing them to
benefit if their activism increases firm value. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2013).
218. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1, 83 (1997).
219. Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 884.
220. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1925–26 (2010) (describing issuer adoption of compensation plans that require
executives to hold stock until retirement).
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equity such as stock options and restricted stock rather than cash.221 By
aligning the interests of insiders with those of shareholders, these
compensation structures also create an incentive for both to exploit
collaboration to maximize firm value. In addition, compensation structures
that involve longer time horizons encourage insiders to collaborate to
produce long-term value for the firm.
2. Decision-Making Rights.—In addition to economic rights, a coalition
also involves decision rights—bargained-for rules that the coalition’s
members accept to regulate their individual say in the deliberative process.
In the corporate context, efficient collaboration involves questions on the
optimal allocation of decision-making power between the board and the
engaged shareholders and the relative say of each shareholder.
Given the positive implications of the equity contract for managing
collaboration’s economic rights, one might think that the “one share, one
vote” rule embedded in that contract should naturally apply to the decision
rights of the collaborative process. We question this conclusion primarily on
the basis that shareholders with similar equity stakes may not be equally
positioned to produce valuable firm-specific information. For example, a
hedge fund that has a private-equity-like investment policy and only invests
in a restricted portfolio of companies (as is the case of ValueAct, for
example)222 might be better positioned to produce complementary
information than a hedge fund of similar size with a larger portfolio of
companies or a larger but highly diversified index fund (as in the case of
Vanguard, for example).
Insights from game theory are again useful here. In cooperative games,
gains are distributed according to each player’s marginal contribution to the
game’s outcome, that is, the incremental value added by that player joining
the game.223 Consistent with this approach, we suggest that a party’s say over
the collaborative process should be determined according to the marginal
contribution of that party’s informational inputs. The marginal contribution
criterion is suited to capture the “specificity” of an informational investment
in a corporation––as under this criterion, specific information that belongs
exclusively to one investor is valued more than information that is shared by
more investors. Put differently, the marginal contribution criterion is well
suited to reflect the value of the sunk costs made by an investor in a given
221. See, e.g., Nitzan Shilon, Putting Directors’ Money Where Their Mouths Are: A New
Approach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 511, 536 &
n.57 (observing that “director pay increasingly includes stock” and restricted stock).
222. WALKER, supra note 77, at 17.
223. This is referred to as the “Shapley value” criterion. MASCHLER ET AL., supra note 212, at
760–61. More technically, in a cooperative game, the possible efficient joint acts (here, the different
coalitions of the board and the investors) are distinguished by the order in which the players may
form a coalition of all players. See id. The Shapley value then accords each player the average of
her marginal contributions to the possible efficient joint acts. See id.
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corporation, costs that may not be directly proportional to the size of the
investor’s equity stake.224
In practice, the contribution criterion will frequently presume that the
board of directors is the “player” with the highest marginal contribution, as
it is the decision-maker that consistently provides the most specific
informational inputs about firm operations. The jargon of game theorists
would therefore term the board the “veto player,” without which the coalition
cannot be formed in the first place.225 As a positive matter, this presumption
is consistent with the substantial authority corporate law grants to the board
of directors in managing the corporate affairs.226 The access of directors
(especially executive directors), as insiders, to unique, firm-specific private
information also normatively supports this presumption. Indeed, the need to
aggregate the partial, complementary information of insiders and
shareholders does not displace standard asymmetric information issues but
rather stands on top of such issues. Making the board the game’s veto player
thus addresses the twin problem of partial and asymmetric information.227
The presumption that the board is the player with the highest marginal
contribution should not be absolute, however. Rather, this presumption
should be regarded as weaker in situations in which the firm is
underperforming. This underperformance signals that investors may be more
likely to add potential value through the production of complementary
information. Here the collaborative-activist strategy of presenting the board
and, if need be, its fellow shareholders, with a detailed plan documenting its
research into the company provides the connection between the activist’s
informational contribution and vesting the activist with an enhanced
deliberative role.228 The mechanism for providing an activist with decisionmaking power is the grant of board seats. The success of the activist in
obtaining board representation depends on the quality of the information that
224. We do not propose to use the marginal contribution criterion for economic rights because
it would create incentives for investors to overstate their contributions (that is, the value of their
complementary information).
225. See MASCHLER ET AL., supra note 212, at 681 (demonstrating mathematically the power
of a veto player to scuttle any coalitions it does not support).
226. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
227. Note, however, the difference from the managerial-power model’s characterization of the
board’s informational advantage. Under that model, the board’s access to private information about
the corporate affairs serves to exclude shareholder informational inputs. Under the collaborative
model, the board’s position as veto player is instrumental to collaboration and hence to the inclusion,
rather than the exclusion, of shareholder inputs.
228. Even skeptics of shareholder activism recognize that credible activists typically approach
the issue with an extensive, well-researched proposal for change. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Dealing
with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activisthedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors/ [https://perma.cc/TB39-M6CL] (observing that “[t]he
activist may approach a company with an extensive high-quality analysis of the company’s business
that supports the activist’s recommendations”).
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it presents. Moreover, both the board and other shareholders play a valuable
role in vetting the activist’s contribution because the activist is only in a
position to obtain board representation if it comes forward with a credible
plan that is likely to receive the support of the other shareholders.
From this perspective, the marginal contribution criterion helps
reconceptualize settlements in which a board voluntarily appoints investors’
representatives in a constructive context as a reflection of a high
informational contribution on the investors’ part. For example, in the
Microsoft case discussed above,229 the appointment of a ValueAct
representative to the board reveals the importance that ValueAct’s
“perception problem” approach had for reforming Microsoft’s business.
More generally, the marginal-contribution criterion provides a basis for
structuring the form of shareholder collaboration and choosing between the
broad spectrum of available collaborative schemes. For example, higher
marginal contributions are more likely to be reflected in greater decision
rights such as through board representation. Conversely, relatively low
contributions are more likely to be organized in the form of “non-binding
outside” deliberation, such as informal meetings.
IV. The Challenges of the Collaborative Model
The discussion in Part III demonstrates how collaboration can increase
firm value and identifies the conditions necessary for collaboration to be
effective when both shareholders and insiders act unselfishly. Under this
assumption, collaboration is not just socially efficient but also individually
efficient for both insiders and collaborating investors. In the real world,
however, things can go wrong. Specifically, insiders and collaborating
shareholders may act opportunistically and either jeopardize the viability of
value-increasing collaboration or exploit collaboration to further their own
interest at the expense of overall firm value. Existing principles of corporate
law, which operate largely from the premise of insider–shareholder
confrontation, emphasize these risks.
In this Part, we identify three basic categories of risks. First, there is the
risk that shareholders and insiders will each engage in detrimental
opportunistic behaviors, exacerbating a firm’s conflicts of interest at the
expense of firm value. Second, shareholders that gain access to firm-specific
information as a result of the collaborative process may misuse that
information to benefit themselves or to harm the corporation. Third, there is
the risk of insider–shareholder collusion that may sacrifice the interests of
other shareholders or nonshareholder constituencies. Corporate law currently
employs tools such as fiduciary duties and confidentiality agreements to

229. See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text.
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address these concerns, but the tools are ill-suited for a collaborative context
and should be rethought.
A.

Conflicts of Interest

1. Transparency, Accountability, and Opportunism.—Collaboration
increases concerns about conflicts of interest in several ways. First,
collaboration may reduce the transparency of firm decision-making. Second,
collaboration may limit the accountability of corporate decision-makers.
Third, collaborating shareholders may exploit their influence over corporate
affairs opportunistically, pursuing objectives with respect to firm value that
differ from those of other shareholders.
The recent increase in negotiated settlements that provide activists with
board representation is an example of both reduced transparency and
accountability. As discussed above,230 insiders are increasingly voluntarily
appointing one or more activist-designed directors to the board to settle an
activist campaign. In many cases, the settlement occurs rapidly, before
outside shareholders have taken a position on the activist’s agenda, and in
some cases, even before the activist’s role has become public. The selection
of the new directors is a matter of negotiation between the insiders and the
activist, displacing the role of outside shareholders in the election process.231
The terms of the settlement may also limit the ability of the new directors to
criticize corporate policy or to vote against board proposals.232 For these
reasons, a number of investors have begun to raise objections to these
settlements.233
Whether or not they obtain board representation, shareholders may
exploit their influence for opportunistic reasons. The most commonly cited
risk of shareholder opportunism is short-termism.234 Some investors, for
230. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03.
231. See Rakhi Kumar & Ron O’Hanley, Protecting the Interests of Long-Term Shareholders
in Activist Engagements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 17, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/17/protecting-the-interests-of-long-term-shareholders-inactivist-engagements/ [https://perma.cc/8GCG-E68S] (expressing concern that “in some cases these
settlements are being reached too quickly and without any input from other shareholders”).
232. Che Odom, Companies Using Deals with Activists to Protect Directors, BLOOMBERG
BNA (June 15, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160616052445/https://www.bna.com/
companies-using-deals-n57982074192/ [https://perma.cc/BB7V-KNAF?type=image].
233. See, e.g., Kai Haakon Liekefett & Lawrence Elbaum, Think Twice Before Settling with an
Activist, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/869160/think-twicebefore-settling-with-an-activist [https://perma.cc/NB74-4RRF] (observing that institutional
investors “are now troubled that companies may settle with activists without seeking the input of
other shareholders”); see also Coffee, supra note 99, at 25 (charging that these settlement
agreements disenfranchise other shareholders that may not support the activist’s nominees).
234. Short-termism can be understood, we argue, as a form of shareholder self-dealing that
produces a conflict between the interests of the short-term shareholders and shareholders generally.
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example, hedge funds with short-term-oriented business models, may benefit
from short-term operational strategies that sacrifice long-term firm value.235
A number of commentators have argued that “the short-term strategies of
many activists are frequently at odds” with the investment horizon of other
shareholders.236 Delaware Supreme Court Justice Leo Strine, for example,
has contended that, although some activist hedge funds are committed to
long-term improvement of their portfolio companies, others pursue business
strategies calculated to produce a short-term price “pop,” at which point they
exit, leaving “buy and hold investors” to bear the consequences.237
But shareholders may also have other conflicts that collaboration may
exacerbate. A shareholder may seek to influence a decision at one portfolio
company to improve the value of its position at another company.238 Or
shareholders may have what Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have termed
“hedging-related conflicts” when they hold positions in different types or

See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68
STAN. L. REV. 67, 114–16 (2016) (describing this conflict).
235. See, e.g., In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2015 WL 13501398
(Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2015) (order granting in part defendants’ motion to dismiss) (citing the concern
that “particular types of investors may espouse short-term investment strategies and structure their
affairs to benefit economically from those strategies”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial:
The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–91 (2015) (arguing
that activist shareholder “pressure may logically lead to strategies that sacrifice long-term
performance for short-term shareholder wealth”); Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 232 (stating that
activists “focus on short-term, event-driven strategies”). Shareholder strategies that are often
criticized as short-term include investment banking interventions like agitating for a sale of the
company, causing the issuer to pay out higher cash dividends or take on additional debt, and efforts
to cut costs, including research and development. Francis Byrd et al., Short-Term Shareholder
Activists, HEDGE FUND J. (July 2007), https://thehedgefundjournal.com/short-term-shareholderactivists/ [https://perma.cc/867J-YE9H].
236. Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 233.
237. Strine, supra note 42, at 1908, 1928.
238. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1071 (2007) (noting that “a hedge fund that owns
shares in Company A may try to use that position to increase the value of another position, say in
Company B, rather than to maximize the share price of Company A”). A well-known example
involves Perry Corp.’s acquisition of additional voting rights in Mylan Pharmaceuticals in an effort
to sway the shareholder vote necessary to approve Mylan’s acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals.
Perry held a substantial interest in King, and King shareholders stood to obtain a 61% premium if
the merger went through, but the deal required the approval by Mylan’s shareholders and did not
appear to be value-enhancing for Mylan. Perry therefore hoped to use its voting power in Mylan to
push through a merger that was not value-enhancing for the company. Several commentators have
discussed the Mylan–King merger and Perry’s conflict of interest. E.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 811, 828–29 (2006); Kahan & Rock, supra note 237, at 1075–76; Steven M. Haas, SEC
Resolves Empty Voting Action Involving King-Mylan Merger, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 19, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/08/19/secresolves-empty-voting-action-involving-king-mylan-merger/ [https://perma.cc/M55T-GF8B].
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classes of securities239 or when they hold both long and short positions.240
More generally, collaboration creates a risk that collaborating shareholders
will use their engagement to further their objectives—financial, political, or
social—in ways that favor their personal interests and do not align with the
interests of their fellow shareholders.241 For example, some commentators
have criticized large mutual funds for advocating sustainability objectives.242
2. Fiduciary Obligations.—The risks raised by shareholders’ conflict of
interests have also led to concerns about the conduct of activist
representatives who serve on the board of directors. Activist directors raise
unique fiduciary issues because they are called to serve both the corporation
(that is, the shareholders at large) and their nominating sponsor.243 As noted
above, the interests of the activist may differ from those of the corporation or
the other shareholders.244 Although a shareholder has the legal right to act out
of self-interest,245 once an activist nominee joins the board, it may not further
that shareholder’s interests over those of other shareholders.246 This has led
some commentators to observe that “the concept of activist representatives
as board members is fraught with potential for conflict.”247
Similar issues have arisen in the VC context in relation to the
appointment of constituency directors, who may be held liable for breaching
their fiduciary duty by favoring the interests of one set of shareholders over

239. An analogous phenomenon occurs in the bankruptcy context because hedge funds, which
have often purchased deeply discounted debt securities, have interests that differ both from other
creditors and from shareholders. See Bo J. Howell, Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 35, 46 (2008) (observing how such conflicts
can create problems when hedge funds serve on a creditors’ committee).
240. Kahan & Rock, supra note 237, at 1072–74. Kahan and Rock describe an example
involving the planned acquisition of MONY by AXA in 2004. Id. at 1073–74; see also In re MONY
Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. Ch. 2004) (describing hedge fund conflicts).
241. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1286 (2008) (describing efforts by CalPERS to use its influence as a
shareholder to further the union interests in a battle with Safeway over worker benefits).
242. In 2018 guidance, for example, the Department of Labor warned that “the Department has
rejected a construction of ERISA that would render ERISA’s tight limits on the use of plan assets
illusory and that would permit plan fiduciaries to expend trust assets to promote myriad public
policy preferences.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-01 (2018)
(alterations omitted) (quoting Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights
and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81
Fed. Reg. 95879, 95881 (Dec. 29, 2016)).
243. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 774 (2008).
244. See Sepe, supra note 58, at 341–60 (providing a detailed law and economics discussion of
the matter).
245. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 241, at 1273 (noting shareholders typically do not owe
a fiduciary duty to the corporation).
246. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239,
240 (2009) (describing the fiduciary concept in the corporation).
247. Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 233.
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another.248 Corporate law has struggled with the tension between this
divergence of interest and classic fiduciary principles, a struggle illustrated
by the Trados249 decision, in which the Delaware Chancery Court noted that
constituency directors who favor the interests of preferred stockholders over
those of common stockholders may breach their fiduciary duties.250
Trados illustrates the limits of fiduciary duties in dealing with horizontal
conflicts among shareholders. One of us has argued that the principle of party
autonomy should operate as a limiting principle to the application of
fiduciary duties, and a constituency director should not be viewed as
conflicted merely because he or she is acting in the interests of that party.251
Shareholder collaboration increases the potential for horizontal conflicts and
requires corporate law to take a more expansive view of mechanisms
designed to allocate shared control without subjecting those mechanisms to
the pervasive limits of conventional fiduciary principles.252
The concern about conflicts is not limited to constituency directors.
When shareholders collaborate with corporate insiders, they are acting
simultaneously for their private benefit and for the benefit of the corporation
in a manner that is designed to influence corporate decisions. The potential
for conflicts has led some commentators to call for a broader scope of
fiduciary duties when shareholders collaborate with insiders. Iman Anatwabi
and Lynn Stout, for example, argued that activist hedge funds’ increasing
control over operational decisions should cause us to reconsider corporate
law’s current restrictive approach to shareholders’ fiduciary obligations.
Indeed, they argued, a shareholder should owe fiduciary duties whenever it
“manages to successfully influence the company’s actions with regard to a
particular issue in which that shareholder has a material, personal economic
interest.”253
This approach is both too broad and too restrictive. Collaboration does
not and should not convert shareholders into fiduciaries, thereby imposing
upon them the burden of demonstrating that, when they attempt to influence
corporate decisions, their actions conform to the strict obligations of
248. For an illustration of the potential divergence between the interests of shareholders and
creditors and its implications for corporate decision-making, see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland,
N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991).
249. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24,
2009).
250. Id. at *7.
251. Sepe, supra note 58, at 377–78.
252. We note that the Delaware legislature endorsed this approach in the context of the
corporate opportunity doctrine. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM.
L. REV. 1075, 1077–79 (2017) (empirically analyzing the Delaware statutory amendment enabling
corporations to opt out of the corporate opportunity doctrine by contract).
253. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 241, at 1295. Notably, the authors focus their proposal
primarily on activist hedge funds.
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disinterestedness and unselfishness.254 Allowing shareholders to pursue their
personal interests is a fundamental component of corporate law, and it is a
critical component of the incentive structure for effective collaboration.
Indeed, the legal requirement of selflessness associated with the role as a
fiduciary would chill all types of shareholder engagement and, as a result,
defang the enhanced involvement of shareholders that has transformed
corporations from the time of Berle and Means.
Moreover, premising fiduciary obligations on a shareholder’s ability to
influence corporate decisions is impractical. Shareholders can influence firm
decision-making through a range of mechanisms, from the introduction of
shareholder proposals to participation in corporate governance organizations.
Even a small shareholder’s actions may be outcome determinative. In the
Proctor & Gamble proxy contest, for example, the margin of victory was
approximately 42,000 votes (out of a total of nearly two billion).255
Accordingly, the vote of any shareholder that voted more than 42,000 shares
was, by definition, outcome determinative, and under a broad definition of
fiduciary such as that proposed by Anabtawi and Stout, such a shareholder
would be held to a duty-of-loyalty standard in defending its voting decision.
3. Insiders’ Conflicts.—Insiders present different types of conflicts.
The most obvious is management entrenchment. Corporate insiders may
make value-decreasing decisions that allow them to preserve private benefits,
including empire-building, large compensation packages, perks, and the
power and prestige of their positions. Although management entrenchment
is not a concern specific to the collaborative model of the corporation,
shareholder collaboration presents distinctive considerations. First, although
shareholder engagement has the potential to reduce entrenchment, the risk
remains that entrenched management might be systematically nonresponsive
and noncollaborative. This is because refusing to collaborate is rational for
management if it allows firm insiders to preserve private benefits that they
could lose in a deliberative process.256
254. The Department of Labor’s effort to impose fiduciary obligations on brokers when they
provide investment advice in connection with a retirement plan raises similar issues about the
feasibility of subjecting a market participant acting out of financial motives to a legal requirement
to act selflessly. See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 366, 388 (5th Cir.
2018) (invalidating DOL fiduciary rule). As one commentator observes: “By nature, any
compensation places the interests of the adviser in conflict with those of the client.” Blaine F. Aikin,
Mitigating Conflicts of Interest in Compensation, INV. NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017, 4:19 PM), http://
investmentnews.com/article/20171025/FREE/171025/FREE/171029963/mitigating-conflicts-ofinterest-in-compensation [https://perma.cc/QUW7-HU3G].
255. Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Concedes Proxy Fight, Adds Nelson Peltz to Its
Board, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-concedes-proxyfight-adds-nelson-peltz-to-its-board-1513377485 [https://perma.cc/52GP-6M4P].
256. This raises the question of whether officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to
collaborate with shareholders and whether their refusal to do so could, under some circumstances,
be actionable.
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Second, there is also the risk that some collaborating investors may
increase managerial moral hazard by reducing their monitoring or otherwise
acquiescing in insider private gains in exchange for concessions. Those
concessions might, in the case of a mutual fund, be governance reforms such
as board refreshment. In the case of an activist hedge fund, the concessions
might be the payment of a cash dividend. Such concessions could be low cost
for the insiders, cosmetic, or favor a hedge fund’s short-term interests, but
the point is both that they relieve insiders from the pressure of investor
oversight and that they are likely to take the form of negotiated settlements
that are neither transparent nor approved by all shareholders.
B.

Misuse of Information
Effective collaboration also requires that, in some cases, corporate
insiders share firm-specific information with investors. This information
sharing can take various forms. Corporate insiders who meet privately with
investors may provide those investors with nonpublic information during
those discussions. Shareholders that gain access to corporate insiders, such
as by identifying representatives to serve as directors or board observers, are
also likely to receive nonpublic information about the corporation, its
operations, and business strategy on an ongoing basis.
Perhaps the most obvious concern raised by information sharing is that
shareholders may use the information to obtain a trading advantage. A variety
of empirical studies report that shareholders who meet privately with insiders
obtain trading advantages.257 Although these studies focus primarily on
interactions that are oriented toward informing trading decisions, such as
meetings with research analysts, shareholder use of information access for
the purpose of trading is a serious concern. In addition, a recent article
analyzes the specific context of the appointment of activist nominees to a
company’s board of directors and finds that such appointments are associated
with information leakage into stock prices.258
The federal securities laws address the misuse of firm-specific
information in two ways. First, insiders who disclose information to
shareholders in circumstances in which that information is likely to be used
in securities trading violate Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD).259
Regulation FD makes it unlawful for corporations and their agents to provide

257. E.g., Jihwon Park & Eugene Soltes, What Do Investors Ask Managers Privately? 7
(Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/
20171206_Park&Soltes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMM8-H33D] (“A body of prior academic literature
finds that investors who gain access to managers privately make more informed trades.”).
258. John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an
Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 422 (2019); see also Coffee,
supra note 99, at 17 (identifying similar concerns).
259. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2018).
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certain kinds of selective disclosure to shareholders.260 Second, federal law
may impose insider trading liability upon both insiders who tip material
nonpublic information to shareholders and the shareholders that trade on that
information.
The disclosure of nonpublic corporate information raises concerns
beyond securities trading, however.261 Shareholders may misuse information
in other ways.262 Shareholders may, for example, use that information
selfishly to gain an advantage for a competing portfolio company. A
shareholder may also simply be careless or sloppy with the information in a
way that harms the interests of the company. One highly publicized example
of information misuse that was not linked to trading involved Bill Ackman,
then a director of J.C. Penney, leaking confidential board information to the
press.263
These concerns have led to a reluctance by the boards of some
companies to share information with shareholders. A company may go so far
as to adopt a policy under which insiders do not meet privately with investors.
Sturm Ruger cited such a confidentiality policy, for example, as the basis for
refusing to meet with large shareholders who were concerned about its
firearms-manufacturing policies.264 Ruger’s confidentiality policy states that
it is expressly motivated, in part, by the need to comply with Regulation
FD.265
Of course, shareholders need not meet privately with insiders to
collaborate. Shareholders can communicate their information or objectives to
companies through letters, emails, or public statements, but these efforts are
likely to be less effective at persuading insiders to reconsider their

260. Id.
261. Shareholders may also use information to obtain a trading advantage in another of their
portfolio companies.
262. One paper, for example, finds evidence that hedge funds anticipate analyst reports with
high information content and posits that the explanation for this finding is that hedge funds
“strategically disclose their private information to sell-side analysts . . . in order to speed the
incorporation of private information into stock prices.” Nathan Swem, Information in Financial
Markets: Who Gets It First? 24 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Fin. & Econ. Discussion
Series, Working Paper No. 023, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939519 [https://perma.cc/Z8C2APT4].
263. Priya Cherian Huskins, Boardroom Confidential: Directors and Their Duty, WOODRUFF,
SAWYER & CO. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://wsandco.com/do-notebook/boardroom-confidential/
[https://perma.cc/F2P5-MRZE].
264. Sturm, Ruger & Co. (RGR) Q1 2018 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA
(May 9, 2018, 6:43 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4171931-sturm-ruger-and-co-rgr-q12018-results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single [https://perma.cc/3GTC-KCKD] (“We don’t do –
we don’t go meet with the big institutional shareholders, we don’t hold meetings with our largest
institutional shareholders like BlackRock or Vanguard.” (quoting CEO Christopher John Killoy)).
265. RUGER, INVESTMENT COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 2019, at 1 (2019), https://
ruger.com/corporate/PDF/InvestorCommunicationPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BZX-A2XN].
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positions.266 Moreover, the refusal of corporate insiders to meet privately
with shareholders prevents the deliberation that distinguishes shareholder
collaboration from other methods of communication.
Even when insiders meet privately with shareholders, however, they
need not share material nonpublic information. The SEC guidelines explicitly
state that Regulation FD does not prevent insiders from engaging privately
with shareholders and offers procedural suggestions designed to prevent the
accidental disclosure of nonpublic information such as preapproving topics
for meeting and ensuring the presence of legal counsel.267 For some investors,
such as mutual funds, meetings that do not involve the dissemination of
nonpublic information by corporate officials are likely to be optimal for both
companies and investors because they both protect companies from potential
securities liability and ensure that investors do not give up their ability to
trade. Indeed, even without disclosing nonpublic information, private
meetings enable insiders to probe investor preferences, explore the reasons
for their positions, as well as provide investors with reasons why their
preferences may not be consistent with the company’s best interests.
The situation may differ for hedge funds. Like mutual funds, some
hedge funds may prefer to avoid obtaining material nonpublic information to
preserve their ability to trade268 and may explicitly request that companies
not divulge any nonpublic information in their private meetings. Moreover,
not every hedge fund collaboration requires insiders to disclose nonpublic
information. For example, if a hedge fund is seeking to influence operational
decisions, it is likely, at least in the initial stages of collaboration, to be
providing rather than seeking information, as evidenced by the fund’s

266. See McCahery et al., supra note 157, at 2906 (presenting survey results in which
shareholders report their frequent use of private engagements with management and directors and
describe those engagements as important).
267. See Regulation FD, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
guidance/regfd-interp.htm [https://perma.cc/EG78-PZSA] (last updated June 4, 2010). As put by
one asset manager, when the SEC guidelines are taken into account, Regulation FD concerns sound
“more of an excuse cited by issuers than an actual obstacle.” MARC GOLDSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL
S’HOLDER SERVS., THE STATE OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN U.S. CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 20 (2011), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2015/09/
IRRC-ISS_EngagementStudy1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGV7-UQKV].
268. Hedge fund representatives are well aware that their access to confidential information
may limit their ability to trade. For example, Mark Cuban reportedly responded after allegedly
receiving confidential information about Mamma.com’s planned PIPE offering, “Well, now I’m
screwed. I can’t sell.” Rachelle Younglai & Robert MacMillan, SEC Charges Mark Cuban with
Insider Trading, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2008, 6:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-secmarkcuban/sec-charges-mark-cuban-with-insider-trading-idUSTRE4AG5IM20081118
[https://
perma.cc/3NEU-FJ5L]. Cuban was subsequently charged with insider trading, but a jury determined
that he was not liable. Jana J. Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider Trading; Blasts
U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 2:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-seccuban-verdict/billionaire-mark-cuban-cleared-of-insider-trading-blasts-u-s-governmentidUSBRE99F0ZM20131016 [https://perma.cc/8RHR-45WH].
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frequent preparation of extensive business plans and proposals.269
Nonetheless, some collaborations require two-way communication of the
private information possessed by both investors and insiders. Because of the
hedge fund’s prior investment in developing firm-specific information as
well as its likely expertise, engagement is likely to be most productive when
the company and the fund can share their partial information to deliberate
and aggregate that information. Moreover, when hedge fund representatives
serve as directors or board observers, they necessarily will become privy to
material nonpublic information.
Insiders have cited the potential misuse of information as a basis for
limiting the access of activist directors to confidential firm information.270
Some companies have even responded to the appointment of activist directors
by forming executive committees of the board to “wall off” an activist
director from information or deliberations.271 Legally, however, activist
directors are entitled to equal access to corporate information as their fellow
directors in order to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the company.272
Activist directors are unlikely to collaborate effectively without such access.
A more complex issue concerns the ability of hedge fund directors or
representatives to share information with others at their fund. Recall that the
collaborative model relies on the fact that shareholders supply
complementary information due to their information advantages in the
market, expertise, and differential knowledge base. This information is not
contained within the brains of the hedge fund’s directors but located
throughout the fund. For activist directors to operate effectively, they must
be able to evaluate company-specific information in the context of the fund’s
knowledge base. This necessarily will involve sharing firm-specific
information with other fund representatives.
Whether such sharing is legally permissible has been the subject of
extensive debate. A number of commentaries have claimed that constituency

269. As Trian principal Ed Garden explains, the purpose of Trian’s initial private meetings with
management is to explain its analysis. “We want to get their opinion of our work. After all, we’ve
done this from the outside and don’t have perfect information. We’d rather be rich than right.” LUIS
M. VICEIRA ET AL., HARV. BUS. SCH., TRIAN PARTNERS AND DUPONT (A) (2017).
270. See, e.g., Lindsay Frost, Activist-Appointed Directors Causing Confidentiality Concerns,
AGENDA (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=
AgendaWeek-040416.pdf&type=subsite [https://perma.cc/6JDR-WYP4].
271. E.g., Christopher P. Skroupa, Onboarding an Activist-Nominated Director — Best
Practices, Risks and Mistakes to Avoid, SKYTOP STRATEGIES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://
skytopstrategies.com/onboarding-an-activist-nominated-director-best-practices-risks-mistakes-toavoid/ [https://perma.cc/Q7KF-MSFY] (explaining that “[t]he formation of an executive committee
effectively walls off the activist investor’s nominees from most of the board’s deliberations”).
272. E.g., Hall v. Search Capital Grp., Inc., No. 15264, 1996 WL 696921, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 15, 1996) (“When management communicates with the directors on matters of concern to the
Board collectively, it cannot pick and choose which directors will receive that information. Absent
a governance agreement to the contrary, each director is entitled to receive the same information
furnished to his or her fellow board members.”).
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directors navigate in perilous waters in transmitting information to their
sponsors.273 Overall, however, the relevant case law seems to suggest that
activist directors are permitted to share firm information with their
sponsors.274 After all, as observed by Vice Chancellor Travis Laster and Mark
Zeberkiewicz, a rule against information sharing would be both unrealistic275
and potentially detrimental.276
Confidentiality agreements can address the concern that an activist
director or fund may misuse material nonpublic information. Indeed, the use
of such agreements is common practice when companies find it beneficial to
communicate material nonpublic information to shareholders.277 For
example, after Trian’s unsuccessful proxy contest against DuPont, DuPont
officials invited Trian to collaborate with them in developing the structure of
DuPont’s subsequent merger with Dow Chemical and split into three
independent companies.278 Because the fact and terms of the merger and the
subsequent spin-offs were, at the time of these negotiations, nonpublic and
highly market sensitive, Trian participated pursuant to a confidentiality
agreement.279

273. See Robert Little & Chris Babcock, Walking the High Wire: Guidelines for Board of
Director Designees of Private Equity Funds, Activist Stockholders and Other Investors, 44 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 2245, 2246 (2012) (claiming that directors’ duty of confidentiality to the company
prevents directors from sharing confidential information with anyone who is adverse to the
company, even when the adverse parties are significant stockholders); Veasey & Di Guglielmo,
supra note 243, at 773–74 (describing the tension between directors’ duty to protect confidential
information and their responsibility to be their sponsors’ “eyes and ears”).
274. See, e.g., Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 208–09 (Del. 2008) (implicitly confirming that
constituency directors can share information with their sponsors); Kalisman v. Friedman, C.A. No.
8447-VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013) (“When a director serves as the
designee of a stockholder on the board, and when it is understood that the director acts as the
stockholder’s representative, then the stockholder is generally entitled to the same information as
the director.”).
275. See J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder
Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 52–53, 55 (2015) (“This rule reflects the practical reality that director
representatives in both public and private companies routinely share confidential corporate
information with colleagues at their affiliated investment funds.”).
276. Id. at 55 (arguing that a rule against information sharing would entail both a breach of duty
of blockholder directors as corporate insiders and investors’ fiduciaries).
277. See Jordan Schoenfeld, Action-Based Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders 19
(Dec. 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.bm.ust.hk/acct/files/Accounting%20
Symposium/2018/_Shareholder_Contracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS7J-4UHU].
278. David Benoit, Dow, DuPont Deal Cements Activists’ Rise, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2015,
9:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-dupont-deal-cements-activists-rise-1449882586
[https://perma.cc/3AN5-KBEA].
279. DowDuPont Inc., Final Proxy Statement/Prospectus 73 (Form 424B3) (June 10, 2016)
(describing meetings between a DuPont executive, a DuPont financial advisor, and four Trian
representatives, pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement to discuss, inter alia, “strategic rationale of
the product portfolios and the optimal allocation of businesses among the public companies
resulting from the potential post-merger separation”).
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Confidentiality agreements largely address legal and practical concerns
over the potential misuse of information.280 The SEC has explicitly stated that
confidentiality agreements are an appropriate way for insiders to limit their
potential liability exposure under Regulation FD.281 Similarly, SEC rule
10b5–2 prohibits anyone who receives material nonpublic information
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement from trading on that information.282
Accordingly, the use of a confidentiality agreement clarifies both the fact that
investors may not use confidential information from their collaborations with
insiders for the purpose of securities trading and the terms on which investors
may share information, such as to others at their firm.283 For the hedge fund
activist, a confidentiality standstill agreement is also likely to be valuable in
that it provides an enforceable commitment by the activist to maintain its
equity position in the issuer as it seeks to work to effect change.
Confidentiality agreements are not a perfect solution to concerns about
the misuse of corporate information, however. First, insistence on
confidentiality agreements as a prerequisite to engagement may chill
potentially valuable collaborations. As noted above, many investors have
liquidity needs that prevent them from limiting their ability to trade, and as a
result, they cannot sign a confidentiality agreement as a condition to meeting
privately with insiders. Second, there is a risk that confidentiality agreements
will be overused. Although collaborating shareholders should not misuse
information, they should not be held to a higher standard than insiders.
Corporate officials are free to trade in their company’s stock with appropriate
safeguards such as a requirement that trades be preapproved or take place
only during specified trading windows.284 Collaborating investors should also

280. Coffee et al. also find evidence that the use of confidentiality agreements in negotiated
settlements of proxy contests is correlated with less information leakage following the appointment
of hedge-fund-nominated directors to the board. Coffee et al., supra note 258, at 423–24.
281. Regulation FD, supra note 268 (“[B]ecause Regulation FD does not apply to disclosures
made to a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence, a private
communication between an independent director and a shareholder would not present Regulation
FD issues if the shareholder provided such an express agreement.”).
282. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–2 (2018).
283. See, e.g., David A. Katz, Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/23/
boardroom-confidentiality-under-focus/ [https://perma.cc/9GJV-7XRT] (“Having a detailed and
robust board confidentiality policy will serve both to advise directors (and their sponsors, if any) as
to their obligations with respect to sensitive board information and to create a board culture that
views leaking as unacceptable and dishonorable behavior.”). For example, when Pershing Square
named Stephen Fraidin to the board of Valeant as part of a settlement agreement, Fraidin wrote a
letter to then-CEO Michael Pearson stating: “I hereby undertake, consistent with my fiduciary duties
and confidentiality obligations as a Valeant director, to refrain from communicating to anyone
(whether to any company in which we have an investment or otherwise) confidential information I
learn in my capacity as a director of Valeant; provided that I may communicate such information to
members of my firm, Pershing Square.” Frost, supra note 270 (emphasis added).
284. Corporate officers and directors are also subject to the short-swing trading limitations of
§ 16(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2018). Those restrictions apply equally to activist-nominated directors.
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be free to trade on these terms. Along similar lines, Delaware law imposes a
duty of confidentiality on directors as part of their duty of loyalty.285 That
duty requires all directors, including shareholder-nominated directors, to
maintain material company information confidential without the need for a
confidentiality agreement.286 Finally, some commentators have raised the
concern that issuers may use confidentiality agreements to “oppress
directors,”287 although such a concern appears more likely when a hedge fund
has obtained board seats through confrontation rather than collaboration.
C.

Collusion

Lastly, shareholders and insiders may also use collaboration to engage
in collusive behavior—behavior that is contrary to the interests of other
shareholders or the public generally. A developing literature, initiated by two
papers examining the airline and banking industries respectively, explores
the possibility that institutional investors may collude to reduce
competition.288 The argument in these papers, which focus primarily on
mutual funds, is that common ownership creates an incentive for investors to
favor anticompetitive behavior to generate monopolistic profits.289 Notably,
these profits have the potential to benefit both insiders and investors. The
authors support their theory by showing that the airline and banking
industries have experienced increased ownership concentration and, at the
same time, reduced competition.290 Although the literature is too extensive to
examine here, and we note that the empirical results of the Azar et al. research

285. Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 197,
200. The duty of confidentiality is part of a director’s general duty of loyalty. Sepe, supra note 58,
at 344; see also Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty,
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 693 (2009); Charles M. Nathan, Maintaining Board Confidentiality, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
corpgov/2010/01/23/maintaining-board-confidentiality [https://perma.cc/F76K-6ARR].
286. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (“The directors’ duty to disclose
all available material information in connection with a request for shareholder action must be
balanced against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in particular, by keeping
certain financial information confidential.”); COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW,
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007), reprinted in 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1500 (2007)
(“A director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not been
disclosed to the public.”).
287. Frost, supra note 270 (quoting director Charles Elson).
288. See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of
Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) [hereinafter Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects] (airline
industry); José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition
(May 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 [https://perma.cc/
G2YH-RQNQ] [hereinafter Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership] (banking industry).
289. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 289, at 1514; Azar et al., Ultimate
Ownership, supra note 289, at 2.
290. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 289, at 1517; Azar et al., Ultimate
Ownership, supra note 289, at 2–3.
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have been challenged on a variety of bases,291 the bottom line is that collusion
between insiders and investors is possible and the novel collaborative
patterns that we describe in this Article may offer an important vehicle for
collusion.
Conclusion
Both the prevailing models of the public corporation frame the insider–
shareholder relationship in terms of a competitive struggle. On this shared
premise, the “battle” between defendants of each model focuses on the
question of the appropriate allocation of power between corporate insiders
and shareholders to reduce the risk of managerial moral hazard.
This Article showed that the reality of the insider–shareholder dynamic
has turned increasingly collaborative. In a coherent, if unheralded, effort,
insiders and newly empowered shareholders are joining forces to promote
deliberative mechanisms for increasing firm value through a variety of means
that include shareholder engagement, private initiatives to develop shared
governance principles, and “constructivist” activism. Despite these dramatic
transformations, corporate law scholars have paid limited attention to
shareholder collaboration. This Article provided a first attempt at remedying
this gap, exploring the implications of the rise of shareholder collaboration.
Descriptively, the rise of collaboration in the public corporation is not a
casual occurrence but can be traced back to the VC context, where founders
and investors have long developed structures to promote joint decisionmaking. Changes in the public-company context have expanded the role of
collaboration. Under these changes, the normative task is no longer only to
determine the appropriate balance of shareholder and manager power.
Rather, it is also to determine the best way to aggregate the partial and
complementary information that insiders and shareholders are likely to
possess in a world of complex investments and reconcentrated equity
ownership. As this Article has shown, collaboration offers a means to that
end that neither unilateral decision-making nor the mediated transmission of
information through markets can provide.
Policywise, the collaborative model has several implications. By
enhancing shareholder influence over firm decisions, collaboration creates
the potential for conflicts of interest, the risk that shareholders may misuse
firm-specific information, and the possibility of collusive behavior. Existing
corporate law tools such as fiduciary duties and confidentiality agreements
291. See, e.g., Patrick Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive
Effects in the Airline Industry 34 (Aug. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3063465 [https://perma.cc/RVS4-Y776] (critiquing the Azar et al. airline study); Edward
B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement
in Corporate Governance 2 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 17-05, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855 [https://perma.cc/WD2W-LZR7]
(same).
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are poorly designed to address these concerns without sacrificing the
potential value of collaboration. Consequently, the growing importance of
collaboration requires rethinking and adapting several existing principles of
corporate law. This Article begins the task; we hope that its observations can
provide a starting point for much needed future research on the new
collaborative model of the public corporation.

